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ABSTRACT
This paper takes a second look at the 2016 American Presidential Primaries from
the perspective of asking what the American people were really after then they chose to
ultimately support populism. Media reports and editorial discussions all pointed to a base
that was somehow backing misogyny and racism. My research points to an alternative.
Populism and social movement theory suggest that the success of anti-establishment
candidacies is not credited to populists alone; in the case of 2016, it had support in the
credibility and political opportunity left by social movements past. And so to investigate
this historic battle between the establishment and anti-establishment candidacies, we can
look to what populism and social movements have in common, and how they merge during
the framing process. Within this context, this research seeks to answer how the antiestablishment candidates of the 2016 American Primaries framed a battle against 'the
establishment' – within an establishment arena and won.
By seeing populism as more of a logic as opposed to an ideology, we can eliminate
a partisan lens in the study of what happened in 2016. By seeing populism as a strategy
when added to a collective action frame of a social movement, we can analyze how it was
used to mobilize voters to action. By using populism and social movement theory, we can
add further context to what voters were experiencing in 2016. This study uses a populist
master frame analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary debates, which ultimately
illustrates the efficacy of populist messaging while exposing the weaknesses of the
establishment rhetorical response. Findings suggest that populist candidates unearthed
deep insecurities in 2016, specifically in areas concerning the economy, foreign policy, and
within the identities affected by loss, discrimination and threats to human rights.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The American presidential primaries of 2016 offered a milieu of electorate angst,
anti-establishment candidacies, and populist showmanship with social movement
characteristics, all culminating into one of the most exciting and politically contentious
climates in modern U.S. history. Was it the clash of ideologies that stirred us so, or the
strategies politicians chose to utilize during their campaigns? Or is it still the current state
that our global politics finds us in?
David Frum (Munk Debates, 2018) has referred to this period as a new populism.
And although it had not yet been in the arena of such an aggressive globalism pitted so
snugly against a requiem for the past, populism is not new. It has not changed – except that
in 2016 America, populism has entered and won in the establishment arena. In an
environment that first relished his outlier status and his verbose command of attention,
Trump handily employed his unique brand of populism – as did the senator from Vermont,
Bernie Sanders.
At the time of this writing, populist-style contenders continue to enter the political
arena. Andrew Wang promises a universal basic income. He frames it as a “freedom
dividend” to help ward off the impending effects of artificial intelligence and automation
(Bloom, 2018, p. 1). Bernie Sanders tags the word “Movement” at the end of his campaign
videos in his 2020 bid to office, employing the same inequality messages of the past.
Meanwhile Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, the youngest person to win a congressional seat in
U.S. political history, handily won the 14th Congressional District in New York using some
of the same Sanders’ rhetoric (Wallis-Wells, 2018). The popularity of all these candidacies
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rests on their clearly stated intentions to buck old establishment ways. Their plans are called
impractical – radical even.
These are explosive, exciting times; not because of the ill-repute populism might
leave in its wake, but because of the increasing saliency of politics and in watching how
different populists wield its power. Populism by nature is disruptive, signifying the
uncomfortable revelations of the greater problems that its mere presence has come to
signify (Judis, 2016). As Judis writes, “Voters have suddenly become responsive to
politicians or movements that raise issues that major parties have either downplayed or
ignored” (Judis, 2016, p. 20). Neither populism nor social movements happen in a vacuum.
This paper explores what happens when old contentions remain, as grievances and
blame still stemming from the Great Recession, pour into the establishment arena under
the powerful steering of populist candidacies. This newly-lit populism in the United States
has divisively ignited the imaginations and activism of the American psyche in its media,
and constituency of all ages. I explore this period through the lens of a populist master
frame comparing findings to a similar frame analysis done on the populist social
movements of the Great Recession. At its core, this particular case study investigates how
the primary anti-establishment candidates framed a battle against 'the establishment' –
within an establishment arena, for the right to lead the country on behalf of ‘the people.’
A caution for anyone interested in improving the practice of politics, the findings
herein illustrates how the complacency of establishment and ineffectiveness of social
movements make ripe the opportunity for intervention of an alternate kind. More than
anything, this paper unveils just how precarious the democratic system is to populism
against the backdrop of changing superstructures. A growing economic insecurity and
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inequality fused with a diminishing feeling of national security readied the conditions of
the primary electoral arena in 2016; they were more cunning; they were wittier at the
podium, and more than anything the populists of 2016 were more consistent in
‘establishing’ what they wanted to set as the framing agenda. The anti-establishment
candidacies of 2016 were bold and unapologetic; willing to name names while riding on
the legitimacy of grievances set in social movements past.
Organizational Overview
I open this journey with a literature review that first dives into the context of the
social movements of the Great Recession and the grievances it left behind. The electoral
angst during the 2016 primary season, was illustrative of the continuation of grievances
and increasing contention Americans were facing at the time. Once context has been
established, I discuss the nexus between populism and social movement theory and how,
at least in the case of the 2016 primaries, political opportunity and agency showed up in
the form of populism when both establishment and social movements failed. And of course
if we are to research how populists operated in 2016, we must also discuss what I mean by
establishment versus anti-establishment candidacies, and the ‘establishment arena’ they
play in. All of these are important factors that will be reconsidered within the discussion
portion of the empirical findings in Chapter V.
The empirical portion of this paper includes a populist master frame analysis of the
2016 American presidential primary season [herein referred to as ‘primaries’], beginning
from August 2015 to April 2016 followed by a further comparative analysis against a
similar case study of the social movements of the Great Recession (see Methodology). This
process will help illustrate how anti-establishment candidates used the populist master
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frame in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment candidacies. This analysis also
works to reveal that those blamed for the grievances of the social movements of 2011 were
the same in 2016. Herein I uncover how Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump drew on the
experiential knowledge, fears and insecurities of a voter base – that in some ways served
as either a new protest cycle of the 2011 Occupy movement.
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2008-2011: An Overview of a Contentions Past
The slide into one of the greatest recessions on record began with a policy decision
that failed to protect the people, a point of contention often brought up by Bernie Sanders
during the 2016 primaries. The Glass-Steagall Act, a separation between commercial and
investment banking, “had been repealed in 1999, and by 2007 income inequality in the
United States had reached pre-1929 levels” (Kitromilides, 2012, p. 8). In 2008, the bottom
fell out of America - as well as other parts of the world, jarring confidence everywhere. In
the United States, it was a time when the repossession of homes, and personal economic
insecurities were at an all-time high. To stress the magnitude of this crisis, I use the words
of a scholar half a world away:
A crisis that began in a small segment of the U.S. housing market evolved
into a global credit crisis of systemic proportions. The impact of the crisis
began to engulf households and business around the world. The most
advanced economies (the U.S., the EU and Japan) were simultaneously in
recession (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 124).
These were the conditions that spawned the global social movements of the Great
Recession, beginning in 2011 with the 15-M Anti-austerity Movement and the Los
Indignados of Spain and Greece, followed by the Occupy Movement in the United States
which extended to various cities throughout the world. In Spain the movement was a protest
against the 41 percent youth unemployment rate, austerity measures, and “the predicted
dominance of the main Spanish political parties in upcoming regional and municipal
elections on 19 May” (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 4). Though he underestimated its impact,
Spanish journalist Miguel-Anxo Murado captured the sentiment of the event when he
wrote, “For all its far-reaching rhetoric, [the movement] … ultimately represents the
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frustration of those who see that it doesn't matter which way you vote, the economic
policies are dictated by the markets; hence the critique of the system” (quoted in Charnock
et al., 2012, p. 5).
Months later, on September 17th, 2011, fueled by similar sentiments to the 15-M,
and the tactic of occupying public squares, the Occupy Movement began. Taking over
Zuccotti Park, purposely in the Wall Street financial district of New York City, occupiers
protested uncertainty, corruption, and inequality. Utilizing a populist master frame
(discussed later in this paper), the leaderless movement strongly positioned itself in stark
opposition to an elite antagonist. Some argued that the movement was a success as
“evidenced by the diffuse reference in cultural and political discourse to the movement's
framing of the 99% united against the corrupting influence of the 1% of elites who control
the majority of global wealth” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185). These were the conditions under
which the Occupy Movement was born:
On the brink of collapse in 2008 and 2009, Wall Street firms were bailed
out by the federal government while millions of Americans lost their jobs
and homes. With a shrinking middle class, poverty reached an all-time high,
and a record 50 million Americans went without health insurance… Adding
to the frustration was the realization that the long-held American work ethic
– work hard and get ahead – was no longer tenable (Lubin, 2012, p. 185).
As Zuccotti Park cleared, however, the 1% was still intact, leaving the 99%
somewhat unchanged while some fell even more behind. These were the conditions under
which the 2016 American election season was born.
A Discussion of Populism and Social Movement Theory
What does populism even mean? In 2018, The Munk Debates questioned
populism’s future as part of their deliberations, attracting both media and protesters to
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Toronto's Roy Thompson Hall. Ex-Breitbart News executive and advisor to Trump, Steve
Bannon, dubbed as “one of the world's most well-known populist thinkers and
campaigners,” (Munk Debates, 2018) defined Trump's populism as an “economic
nationalism” when he said to a somewhat mocking crowd:
Trump's economic nationalism doesn't care about your race, your ethnicity
or your colour… It cares if you're a citizen. We're at the beginning of a new
political revolution and that is populism… is it going to be populist
nationalism that believes in capitalism and deconstructing the
administrative state and giving the little guy a piece of the action, and break
up this crony capitalism of big corporations and big government? Or is it
going to be Jeremy Corbin and Bernie Sanders type of populist socialism?
(Munk Debates, November 2, 2018).
Atlantic journalist, and former speechwriter to President George W. Bush, David
Frum, offered this in response:
[Populism] claims to speak for the people, but it always begins by
subdividing the people and by saying some among the people, because of
their skin or the way they pray, or their gender, whom they love or how they
conduct themselves - or for some other reason. Populism begins by dividing
the country between those people and us people and saying those people do
not matter and our people do … this new populism, it's a scam, it's a lie, it's
a fake (Munk Debates, November 2, 2018).
In the greater public sphere, the defining moment for contemporary populism blurs
further still. In October 2018, Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, tried to co-opt the ‘right
type of populism,’ aligning himself with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: “I think
Justin Trudeau and I are also populists. We are,” he says, “of [a] populism which is
delivering for the people” (CBC News, October 25, 2018). This tendency of politicians to
want to appear as an ally of ‘the people’ seems par for the course. In the loose proliferation
of the term, Oliver and Rahn (2016) write that this is “why the populist label gets so widely
applied” (p. 191). The difference, however, is not in the adoption of the term, but the
©2019, Nancy Duffy
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centrality of its practice. “[P]opulists do more than simply paint themselves on the side of
the majority; they make populist rhetoric the center of their campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn,
2016, p. 191).
To Judis (2016) populism is seen as more of a logic with utility throughout the
political spectrum, as opposed to its typical attribution as a right-wing-only ideology (p.
14). Populism belongs to no one specific party, but rather employs a particular sensibility
between leftwing and rightwing actors. According to Judis, leftwing populists work
vertically, pitting the interests of ordinary masses in stark contrast to those in power.
Rightwing populists will usually add a third party to the mix fighting those from above and
below. This type of rightwing populist “champions the people against an elite that they
accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance of immigrants, Islamists,
or African American militants” (Judis, 2016, p. 14). Judas (2016) draws a further
distinction on the right, however, between rightwing populism and “a conservativism that
primarily identifies with the business classes against their critics and antagonists below”
(p. 14). Regardless of ideological affiliation, “with the aid of the medium of mass
mobilization” (Türk, 2018, p. 153), populism assumes at the very least, the existence of
two rival groups; the disadvantaged (us) against the advantaged (them) elite.
Aslanidis (2018) concurs. Populism belongs to no one ideology, but above mere
logic, he sees it as a form of anti-establishment discourse in the name of the people – that
when added to a collective action frame, becomes more of a strategic tool. In this sense,
and within the context of social movement framing theory, Aslanidis views “populism as a
mobilizing frame” (p. 444). His work identifies how populist framing was made manifest
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during the social movements of the Great Recession, which I refer to later in the empirical
portion of this paper.
So the different schools of thought on populism are those that believe populism as
belonging to a particular extreme version of ideology; as more of a benign cooptation of
other politicians, as a form of economic nationalism; as a divisive scam, versus those that
see it as logic or a strategic tool of mobilization. For the purposes of this research, I adopt
the definition of populism similar to that of John Judis (2016) and Paris Aslanidis (2018),
defining populism as both a logic as well as a strategic tool for the purpose of mass
mobilization.
Where Social Movements and Populism Converge
The social movements of the Great Recession were effective in using populism as
a mobilizing force by framing the 99% of a collective humanity against the 1% of a corrupt,
billionaire class (Aslanidis, 2018). It built a consensus which manifested in colourful
protests and the occupation of public spaces; an overt exercise of power. In terms of real
change, however, the social movement fell short. The movement had no real access to the
establishment process and lacked the enduring motivating power and leadership to change
it.
This case study relies heavily on the 2018 work of Paris Aslanidis for two reasons.
First, the empirical methodology of this study was inspired by his 2018 analysis on the
social movements of the Great Recession and their use of “populism as a collective action
master frame” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 443). And second, for how he draws attention to the
connection between mobilization, social movement theory and populism. He is one of the
first scholars to argue that the “Great Recession mobilizations can be meaningfully
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understood as a wave of populist social movements, instigated via the politicization of
citizen identity” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301/302). And although some prefer not to use the
terms “populist movements” and “populist social movements” interchangeably, Aslanidis
(2016) points to the work of contemporary scholars who “conceptualize the American
populists as both a social and a political movement… contending that ‘authentically
populist social movements and parties have played important roles at critical times’ in
American history” (p. 302). This then provides an opportunity to borrow the literature of
social movements to help explain the populist attributes of the 2016 primaries. To Aslanidis
(2016), there is a clear “relation between social movements and electoral politics [that]
should serve an opportunity to bring social movements and populism theorists together”
(p. 303).
Although Aslanidis boldly marks an association between these two schools, he
builds on the work of those before him who have drawn loose parallels between the social
movements of the Great Recession, and populism. Judis (2016) writes that populist
“campaigns and parties have converged in their concerns, and in the wake of the Great
Recession, they have surged” (p. 13). Until recently, “there was no concerted effort toward
building a comprehensive framework for the study of populist mobilization, despite its
growing significance in the past decades” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301). I suspect that the
current election cycle (2020) and the results of the last one (2016) may change that. Here,
through the help of a scholar’s attempt to publicly explain populism, I will build an
illustration of what populism and social movements have in common; how they merge
during the framing process and how the greatest difference between them lies in the direct
rhetorical leadership of the populist.
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In September of 2016, scholar and writer, Niall Ferguson told an audience for
Zeitgeist Minds that there are five ingredients needed for populism to emerge: an increase
in immigration, increased inequality, a major financial crisis, the perception of corruption,
and finally a demagogue (Ferguson, 2016, Time 2:31-5:40). Four of these five precursors
also make up part of social movement theory. The bridge between populist-style social
movements and populism lies in the strategies they have in common and the grievances
people face.

Just Immigration or Population Changes?
A new Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 saw “a flood of new immigrants,
including unskilled labor from Latin America and Asia” (Judis, 2016, p. 44). With the
influx of a plentiful, low-cost labor force, this new immigration policy had inadvertently
aided in lowering wages while also impugning union powers (Judis, 2016). In addition to
the consequences of conventional immigration laws, international conflicts exert further
pressure on an already feeble system, like that of the Syrian refugee crisis. These pressures
only further exasperate the growing disparity between parties; where Democrats want to
open up borders, Republicans prefer a more selective, cautious approach. The reasons for
caution have ties to national security in fears of terrorism, but also to that of a feeling of a
potential loss in national identity. By 2050, North America “is projected to be a majority
minority… replacing the self-confidence of white majorities with an existential insecurity
channeled by the lightning rod of immigration” (Kaufman, 2019, p. 2). Ferguson’s
necessary ingredient of immigration for populism, therefore, is valid but also highly
limiting as it relates solely to a right-winged perspective of the term. And since we have by
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now discovered that populism is non-partisan, I would, therefore, expand Ferguson’s
confined ingredient of immigration to one of population change in general.
Populations move not only internationally, but within nations as well; from rural
areas to cities; from state to state; from cities to suburbia. People are always moving. They
move from belonging to one demographic category to another as they age; their differences
in political perspectives also change; and new cohorts are formed. Within these changes
the opportunities to support these populations as they morph, also changes, and sometimes
the opportunities fall short. Jack Goldstone's (2002) perspective on social movement theory
supports the idea that changes of population can act as source of contention. There is not
enough time and space to go through all of the possible factors affecting population
changes, but as an example, let us expand on one demographic in the form of American
youth. Goldstone (2002), for instance, posits that “[p]roblems arise when there is a
persistent mismatch between employment prospects and the size and nature of the labor
force” (p. 10). This may include reasons of immigration but does not have to.
In the United States, a factor of political discontent for youthful Sanders' supporters,
for instance, might be “over-education relative to the caliber of available jobs” (Goldstone,
2002, p. 10), a grievance compounded by growing student loans. Experiences within
demographic groups, like Mannheim’s political generation concept, are also a factor.
Mannheim theorizes that “political generations emerge when particular birth cohorts are
exposed to highly distinctive life experiences during adolescence or young adulthood”
counting the “protest cycle among these distinctive life experiences” (Goldstone &
McAdam, p. 195). The baby boomer generation, for instance, during their youth, for the
first time through the American education system and their involvement in the protests of
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the 1960s, drew the attention of media, movements, and businesses. It was a generation
that enjoyed the luxury of economic advantage; one who was readily available for protest.
As suggested by the Manheim theory, this 1960s youth cohort had “a strong sense of
generational identity and ‘history-making’ potency… the capacity to act as a conscious
political group” (Goldstone & McAdam, p. 211).
Fast forward to 2016, you have a cohort of youth that remembers the Occupy
Movement; a youth living in a world where some of the top American organizations are
run by people close to their own age (Mark Zuckerberg is merely 34). They have the
memory of a protest cycle, the advantage of organization through the education system,
and a strong millennial identity. To add to the political generation concept, however, is the
addition of the real grievance of the lack of economic advantage and security that past
generations once had. This may only further fuel the ‘strong sense of generational identity
and history making potency’ that Mannheim’s political generation concept describes.
With respect to population changes and affects between rural and urban areas, some
suggest that the 2008 recession may have affected rural and urban populations differently.
This might help explain the rural/urban divide among supporters between primary
candidacies. One study analyzing institutional confidence levels after the Great Recession
found “that individuals who live in the counties that experienced the greatest economic
shocks have larger declines in confidence in the federal government and organized labor
than those living in other counties” (Danziger, 2013, p. 23). This variance in population
experience between rural and urban areas can help explain the Republican / Democrat
rivalry – where rural populations tend to support the Republican base and urban
populations, the Democrats.
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Growing Inequality, Corruption, and a Major Financial Crisis
Just as is the case with social movements, Niall Ferguson gets it right when he
points out how increased inequality, a major financial crisis, and the perception of
corruption, work as ingredients for populism. Social movement theorists refer to these
issues, generally, as grievances, which come in many forms and affect collective groups
differently.
The genesis of this research began with wanting to further explore the impact of
lost work and identities stemming from the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 and what
it meant for the politics of America. Though economic inequality started decades before,
2008 and beyond was described as “the most severe recession since the Great Depression
of the 1930s” (Danziger, 2013, p. 6). Real wages have since stagnated or actually
decreased, greatly impacting the lower to middle class worker, making way for a renewed
form of contentious politics in America. Bad trade deals, corruption and lobby influences
were seen as part of the problem with an understandable “public skepticism… [in]
opposition to American firms moving plants overseas” (Judis, 2016, p. 45).
Social movement theory supports, at the very least, a conversation about the effects
of structural changes and modernization on society, as a source of growing inequalities and
potential crisis. In challenging the notion of whether or not modernization was a cause of
contentious politics, Charles Tilly (1973) had cast aspersions on Samuel Huntington’s
findings on the matter. Tilly cited Huntington’s lack of evidentiary support for “the effects
of changes in the rate of social and economic modernization within the same country” (p.
432) as a reason to disagree with his position. Huntington (1968) had accredited the
contentious conflict between the years of 1958 and 1965, to “rapid social change and the
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rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of
political institutions” (p. 4). He goes on to explain that as innovations and modernization
begins to take hold within a conventional society, some “sources of identity and
association… may be undermined and destroyed... Others, however, may achieve a new
consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable” (p.
38).
Arthur Brooks, a social scientist and scholar, has been championing awareness of
what he refers to as the dignity gap since 2014. By ‘dignity gap’ he means that parts of
America have been suffering with the phenomenon of no longer being needed. The
disappearance of jobs from the North American market, has changed the very nature and
pay of work. He argues that past policies “got the U.S. government into the business of
treating people left behind by economic change as liabilities to manage rather than as
human assets to develop” (Brooks, 2017, p. 3). And while identities in some parts of the
U.S. are being lost, others are being voiced in the form of Black Lives Matter, women’s
rights, equal work for equal pay, etcetera. So there is not only a disparity in income
equality; and equality of rights, but also a growing identity gap. Nevertheless, these gaps
coincide with Huntington’s (1968) earlier idea of the lost and found identities in the wake
of modernization processes.
Indeed the issue of growing inequality has inspired new research into
modernization and structural influence on greater society. One of the reasons the Great
Recession was felt so widely around the world was due to the global market ties between
industry and countries. This globalization made possible what is referred to as
financialization whereby “during a period of hegemonic transition... capitalist elites
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respond to increased international competition by shifting their investments from
production to finance” (Van der Zwan, 2014, p. 104). In her study on the
internationalization of global markets, Van der Zwan (2014) points to the disproportionate
compensation between executives and employees, as executives are now more so rewarded
on the basis of stock value as opposed to actual production output (p. 107).
Not only are financial rewards disproportionately favouring managers and
executives, but the research consensus is that these rewards are given at the expense of
employees. It is as Van der Zwan (2014) writes, “a dramatic picture, in which the pursuit
of shareholder value is directly linked to declining working conditions and rising social
inequality for large segments of the population” (p. 109). Much in the same way that antiestablishment candidacies accuse establishment of being influenced by lobbyists and
superPAC funding, the new ‘financialization of global markets’ may be affecting corporate
behaviours, as executives seek out ‘market performance’ enhancers as a path to higher
compensation (p. 110). Van der Zwan (2014) cites “internationalization of global markets
[as a] major impetus for firms to withdraw from productive activities” (p. 104), while also
incentivizing offshore production.
Under the guise of neo-globalization, other structural influences are also underfoot
which will serve to challenge economic equality now and in the future. Automation and
artificial intelligence are expected to fundamentally change entire industries. And while
new jobs and opportunities will be created in its wake, “technological advancement has
stagnated or even shrunk earnings for much of the population across nations” (Islam, 2018,
p. 933). Still, to date, there is little evidence that establishment politics is preparing for the
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impending repercussions. In this case, Huntington’s view of the modernization process and
a slow-to-move establishment as cause of contention, becomes more and more relevant.
Social movement theorist, Ted Gurr (1968) refers to fissures in equality as the
culprits behind what he terms as ‘relative deprivation’ – a driver of contention. He describes
this as “a state of mind that can he defined as a discrepancy between people’s expectations
about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably entitled, on the one
hand, and on the other their value capabilities – what they perceive to be their chances for
getting and keeping those goods and conditions” (Gurr, 1968, p. 51). Skocpol (1979)
describes this as a condition that occurs when “a gap between the valued things and
opportunities they feel entitled to and opportunities they actually get” (p. 9). The American
dream used to be achievable – the loss of good-paying jobs, a growing inequality and
shrinking middle class now have citizens believing otherwise. As stated by Lubin earlier
regarding the Great Recession – “the long-held American work ethic – work hard and get
ahead, was no longer tenable” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185).

A Demagogue or Something Else?
The fifth ingredient that Ferguson deems necessary for populism is the presence of
a demagogue. But a demagogue and populist are not the same thing. It is no surprise, that
like populism, demagoguery lacks consensus in definition. A term originally coined by the
Greeks, the meaning of demagogue ranges from something as banal as being “a leader of
the people” (Hogan & Williams, 2004, p. 152) to someone who makes “dangerous popular
appeals” (Ceaser, 2007, p. 258). For others still, a demagogue is merely “a label used to
discredit those who offend our rhetorical or ideological sensibilities” (Hogan & Williams,
2004, p. 153).
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Most of these definitional variations, however, might be fine for a Donald Trump,
but would omit cases like Bernie Sanders. His rhetoric is not consistent with the pejorative
connotation of a demagogue, yet his framing of speech and leadership style is indeed
populist. Here is where Niall Ferguson and I disagree. And to help clarify my point, I refer
to the work of Michael Federici. In The Challenge of Populism, Federici (1991) contrasts
the ‘populist demagogue’ and their style of oratory to that of ‘the statesman.’ Quoting John
Hallowell, he writes, “The statesman is concerned with inspiring right action, and the test
of his statesmanship is his ability to lead public opinion rather than slavishly to follow it”
(p. 120). He further clarifies his position by describing a true statesman as one who in their
attempt to lead, “tries to persuade [the people] by means of argument” (p. 120). Whereas
the demagogue, on the other hand, is more inclined to “publicly berate their opponents,
using hyperbole to characterize their positions” (p. 120). In Sanders and Trump we can see
the respective statesman and demagogue, but that does not preclude either from their use
of populism. Rather than the presence of a demagogue, therefore, the fifth component of
populism, could be seen as the actual populist – or agent who uses populism as a means to
mobilize people to action.
Ferguson is right in that grievances alone do not lead to populism (otherwise his
list of five would be one), just as grievances alone are not enough to lead to the collective
action within a social movement. Goldstone (2002) writes that “it is a profound and
repeated finding that the mere facts of poverty and inequality or even increases in these
conditions, do not lead to political or ethnic violence” (p. 8). Rather, in addition to
grievances, “there must be some elite leadership to mobilize popular groups and to create
linkages between them” (p. 8). Supporting Goldstone's point, McCarthy and Zald (1977)
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add “issue entrepreneurs and organizations” to the list of acceptable elite leadership (p.
1215) – a brief discussion on the agency of populist leadership is then warranted.
Barr (2009) looks at the advent of populism by analyzing the “nature of political
appeals, the individual's location vis-à-vis the party system and the linkages emphasized,”
(p. 44). Through this lens, populism can be precisely defined as “a mass movement led by
an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment
appeals and plebiscitarian linkages” (Barr, 2009, p. 38). Note that these appeals do not have
to be partisan; nor do they have to be denigrating in nature.
Generally, linkages have to do with “the means by which political actors and
constituents exchange support and influence” (Barr, 2009, p. 34). Plebiscitarian linkages
(meaning direct vote) are associated with populism because there is an implication that in
populism, a direct relationship exists between the populist and ‘the people.’ This direct
relationship, however, is highly symbolic, that “although citizens feel like direct
participants… they are expected to delegate power to a politician who claims to be the
embodiment of their redemption” (Barr, 2009, p. 36).
This anti-establishment, plebiscitarian, ‘go it alone’ maverick behavior of a populist
– aligns with the sentiment that “establishment is not willing, or perhaps incapable of
moving fast enough toward a solution to the perceived crisis” (Judis, 2016, p. 16) – and so
something else is needed. The populist then becomes the leadership component and agency
that social movements sometimes lack. But there is more to how and why populism showed
up effectively in 2016. This is where I look to social movement theory to fill in what
Ferguson has left out.
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What Populist Assumptions Leave Out, Social Movement Theory Will Provide
So far we have discussed all the conditions that Niall Ferguson says are needed in
order for populism to exist. In the case of the 2016 American Primary season, and the
surprising success that populism showed in the general election, there are a few additional
considerations that come to mind. A further look into other theoretical positions of social
movements could help explain how populism might not only exist but actually succeed.

Political Opportunity, Even After the Movement Dies
The failure of the social movements of the Great Recession does not mean that the
grievances were not real nor that they still are not real. In this section I argue that if
grievances are not dealt with by the establishment, in essence, if establishment fails, and
even if ensuing social movements thereafter fail, that contentious politics will continue and
create opportunity for something else to step in. In the case of 2016, that something else
was populism. It is as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) write that “the repeated empirical finding
[is] that in many situations, even after controlling for other factors, increased repression
leads to increased protest mobilization and action” (p. 181).
Political opportunity involves changes in the dynamics of a situation that somehow
transform the expectations of what can be done (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163). When conditions
change, new possibilities emerge; new material, new resources, new supports can be
thought of; new discussions can be had about how people might do things differently. This
means that although a social movement fizzles out, its work was not done in vein. The
death of a movement and persistence of grievances can arguably create new political
opportunity for the populist to come in and take up the work started in the movement
before. In this sense a dead social movement, followed by a successful populist challenge
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(in that the populist successfully activates people toward consensus and action – or even
election!) can be seen as simply a new cycle of protest. It is as Tarrow (2011) writes:
As conflict collapses and militants retire to lick their wounds, many of their
advances are reversed, but they often leave behind incremental expansions
in participation, changes in popular culture, and residual movement
networks. Cycles of contention are a season for sowing, but reaping is often
done during the periods of demobilization that follow, by late-comers to the
cause, by elites, and by authorities (Tarrow, 2011, p. 266).
Outside of the election process, establishment can still be challenged, but it leaves
little room for ‘maverick’ antics, and opportunity then becomes on the side of establishment
to appease grievances by other means. “If the state is in a position to negotiate and appease
the social sectors where from these demands originate, then populist mobilization will not
ensue” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 447). But in this case the state, or establishment had not
reconciled in any real way with the movement concerns and because the movement came
to a natural decline, they did not have to. An election cycle, however, presents new political
opportunity for populists in that the establishment arena becomes officially open for
business, and positions are formally up for challenge. Social movements do not have direct
access to the electoral arena though some might try to affect its course anyway.
With all the political opportunity left behind from the social movements of 2011,
coupled with standing grievances and an open electoral arena to establishment, the 2016
American elections made for a most opportune time for a populist agenda. Had the Occupy
Movement succeeded, the reasoning to pursue a populist agenda would be mute. But in
this case, by taking up the same unaddressed grievances, the populist borrows the
credibility of the prior movement’s claims, already validated by its followers in the 99%:
The majoritarian view of democracy implicitly provided legitimacy for the
movement and its claims; at the same time, divisions among the 99 percent
©2019, Nancy Duffy
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were underplayed, since the vagueness of the collective identity allowed
everybody to feel part of the in-group. The Statement of Autonomy
proclaimed Occupy a people's movement (Aslandis, 2016, p. 311).
Other political opportunity considerations include outside interferences at the
macro level that may work to further induce mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628).
In 2011, the macro-level events in Greece, Spain, and the United States exposed
commonalities between movements which created more impetus for others to join the
cause. The social movements of the Great Recession uncovered a collective clash between
neo-globalization efforts and the needs of people and their communities; an unearthing
which served as fodder for new populist activity in America as well as Europe.
Another element that perhaps made ripe the ascent of candidates like Donald Trump
and Bernie Sanders is the normalization and possibly even a preference for a less formal,
grassroots form of content creation. “These new forms of interactive digital media also
shift the focus away from a transmission model of traditional news framing effects to a
more interactive, social constructivist, and ‘bottom-up’ model of framing” (Nisbet, 2010,
p. 75). In some ways, the informal, direct discourse made possible by social media has
perhaps made clearer, the path for populism, and its practitioners, to take hold in times of
contentious politics.

Name it, Blame it, Change it. Framing in Populism and Social Movements
We now know that political opportunity in the form of a new collective awareness
and credibility of grievances, an openness to establishment through the electoral arena, and
the greater normalization for populist-like discourse through social media, all helped the
American populists of 2016. But what else? While all of these catalytic conditions were
critical to the populist fates of the 2016 primaries, the season had one further special sense
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of agency behind it. In addition to those mentioned above, political opportunity can also
be affected by a mobilization of resources through the framing process itself. This occurs
when “the framing of entire episodes of contention” can be seen as a “mechanism … in the
immediate environment that triggers mobilization” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163) by bringing
bystanders and even converts into the process. This is exactly what the populist master
frame was made for!
I mentioned credibility earlier because its role is significant in the framing process
that carried the populists of the day. The aftermath of the Occupy Movement gave the
American populists of 2016 the credibility to name the corruption and grievances that
remained unaddressed by establishment, despite the social upheavals of 2011.
Establishment had not changed all that much and inequality had only since grown. One
study done the same year as the primaries had shown that the middle class was in decline,
nationwide, across American cities – “the share of adults living in middle-income
households fell in 203 out of 229 U.S. metropolitan areas examined from 2000 to 2014”
(Fry & Kochhar, 2016, p. 3). A falling middle class automatically widens the gap between
the one percent elites and the rest of society (the 99 percent) that Sanders so frequently
cites within his political rhetoric. When the middle falls out, only the ends remain. So the
grievances of the 2011 social movements were not wrong. The populists knew it and were,
therefore, easily able to tap into people’s ‘experiential knowledge’ (Goffman, 1974),
adding more credibility to the populist frame. Therefore, this void that remained from the
dust of the social movements of the Great Recession granted the opportunity for populism
to move in.
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I begin this next section by first providing a general definition and purpose of
framing, followed by the meaning of a collective action frame and all of its working
components. I then explore what it means to use populism as a collective action frame and
how the collective action frame can extend to what is known as a master frame.
The framing process is both a meaning-making and mobilization machine and yet,
useless without a driver. A frame sets the structure for the needed identity work that aids a
movement practitioner or populist in telling motivational stories about issues; how the issue
came about and what needs to be done. A frame is defined as “a central organizing idea for
making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 300,
also Gamson, 1989, p. 157). The process of framing is deliberative in defining and
promoting certain information and ideas over others. Entman (1993) refers to this as a
process of “selection and salience” (p. 52). Although not always perceived as intended, the
salience of a well-constructed frame has the power of making some issues “more
noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” over others by simply including some
facts at the exclusion of others (p. 52-53). In the context of describing how media uses
framing, Entman defines faming as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived
reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a
particular interpretation” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). In keeping with his definition of
populism as strategy, Aslanidis (2018) defines frames as “discursive structures aiming to
supply and make available versions of reality that cater to their producers’ strategic needs
in the wider struggle for social meaning making” (p. 445).
Benford and Snow (2000) have done an extensive amount of research on collective
action frames, master frames and framing tasks. They describe framing as a means “to help
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render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and
guide action” (p. 614). This stems from Erving Goffman’s (1974) fixation on frames as
“the organization of experience” (p. 11). But a framework, he writes “allows its user to
locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences
defined in its terms” (p. 21) even if subconsciously. And so the negotiation for meaning
making begins with the framing process and the agency of the one who uses it.
Collective action frames work as a structural tool to help movement practitioners
(or populists) build consensus about an issue by first defining the problem at hand. Once
defined, the framework then sets out to “make attributions regarding who or what is to
blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to
affect change” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). Components of the collective action frame,
as suggested by Gamson (1995) include “injustice, agency and identity” (p. 90). The
injustice piece implies that the problem being identified is not merely a ‘wrong’ but a
“moral indignation… laden with emotion” (p. 90). Emotions play a significant role in
populist movement making, which I discuss later. The agency component suggests that
desired changes are achievable if effected “through collective action” (p. 90). Lastly, the
element of identity “refers to the process of defining this ‘we,’ typically in opposition to
some ‘they’ who have different interests or values” (p. 90). But when added with the edge
of populism, the identity component is most affected.
The literature suggests that when used as a collective action frame, populism has
the ability to cover all three components of ‘injustice, agency and identity.’ “As a collective
action frame, populism is based on an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign
people, invoking the value of popular sovereignty to seek redress for injustices perpetrated
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by unaccountable elites that have usurped political authority” (Aslandis, 2018, p. 447). The
2018 Aslanidis study proposes that the social movements of 2011, including the Occupy
Movement, used this form of collective action frame, where populism was used to mobilize
‘the people’ to action (p. 443). This particular frame’s openness to other groups is what
brings us to the concept of a master frame.
Master frames are like collective action frames which broadens the framing process
to include more than one issue or use devices to simplify blame. This opens the movement
up in a way that can be as inclusive as possible to others. If successfully executed, the
master frame “invites other groups to recognize its utility and potentially exploit it in
mobilizing their own constituencies, profiting from the opening of a fresh discursive
opportunity” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 445). “In this sense,” Aslanidis (2018) writes, “master
frames differ from movement-specific collective action frames by informing a wide array
of protest events, providing movement entrepreneurs with a generic rubric for blame
attribution, amenable to customization and adaptation to particular needs and objectives”
(p. 445). The rights framing of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s was a great example
of a master frame that opened up for other movement entrepreneurs, like the women’s
rights movement, LGBT and “gay rights, animal rights, abortion rights, fetal rights, and
student rights” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 4). The populist messaging executed in the
Occupy master framing process, however, was one easily understood, and resonated around
the world. “As the best slogans do, it concentrated the most basic issues into a phrase. That
Wall Street represented the ‘1%’ was of course an implication, but the frame also brought
a more general inequality into focus” (Calhoun, 2013, p. 33).
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Framing Tasks and Devices
The framing tasks as assigned by Benford and Snow (2000) help to organize the
negotiation process toward the goal of mobilization by either moving people toward action
or toward some sort of consensus on an issue. There are three framing tasks designed to
achieve these initiatives: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. The diagnostic
framing process is where grievances or the issue in need of change is defined while also
ascribing blame. What to do about the grievance or issue is handled during the prognostic
framing process. Lastly, inciting supporters to action becomes the job of the motivational
frame. This is where “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes
beyond the diagnosis and prognosis” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 202) and where reasoning
and framing devices come into effect.
Framing devices are simplified messages, mottos, slogans, or metaphors used to
quickly amplify meaning within a frame. If well done, devices increase the memorability
of a message, while also inviting buy-in and even participation in its repetition. “We are
the 99%” for instance was a catchphrase termed by David Graeber an American anarchist
activist (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 311). Hashtag ‘#OccupyWallStreet’ was first coined by Kalle
Lasn, founder of Adbusters, through a blog and twitter post that actually brought people
out to Zuccotti Park on September 17th, 2011. Per Lasn, “The whole idea behind Occupy
Wall Street was that we, the people, would go to the iconic center of global capitalism,
which is Wall Street, and we would take it over. It's a hell of a sexy idea, right?”
(Middlewood, 2012, p. 32). The point was to motivate people to some action. Framing
devices, the phraseology of motivating words and slogans is a tactic often used in
advertising, their meaning and intent are direct. Reasoning devices on the other hand, are
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more of an implication. They are much less obvious and work to “form a route of causal
reasoning which may be evoked when an issue is associated with a particular frame” (Van
Gorp, 2010, p. 91). In this case as the receiver is interpreting the framed message, the hope
is that they will make a “causal inference … in line with the [intent of] the reasoning
devices” (p. 91).
These devices are particularly useful in motivating consensus or action, especially
through the use of emotional triggers like fear or moral arguments. Within this context, the
use of fear for instance, might come in the form of iterating the threat of something
happening if something else is not done. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) consider threat as part
of creating political opportunity. Here the idea is that despite being repressed and feeling
the pressures of a system working against you, that the threat of something worse will be
enough to mobilize people to action (p. 183).
Are Framing Tasks Populist by Design?
Populism, when taken apart, can be seen as employing the same framing logic as
social movements. Populists may differ slightly in tactics, perhaps more so in actual
rhetorical style between rightwing and leftwing populists. But generally in populism, there
is a “vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top” (Judis, 2016, p. 15).
Earlier we read how David Frum talked of populism, calling it “a scam… that claims to
speak for the people, but it always begins by subdividing the people” (Munk Debates,
November 2, 2018). And yet if we look to the collective action framing in social movement
theory, the mechanics of ‘identity juxtaposition’ are the same. By defining the grievance
and the blame during the diagnostic phase of framing one “defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a
movement’s structure of conflict and alliances” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31).
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Because frames are socially constructed, they require agency in the construction of
meaning making (Benford & Snow, 2000). In the same way that “movement actors are
viewed as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning”
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613), populists are also signifying agents. In the populist master
frame deployed in 2016, the populist is the one naming the grievance, the one who calls
the blame, and for the prognostic framing task, serves themselves up as being the directto-people-solution. The populist becomes the agency in the “meaning making struggle”
(Aslanidis, 2018, p. 444).
More specifically, the motivational framing task, as seen through the populist's lens,
is rhetorically designed as a means to move people to action. This task in social movements
is referred to as “the agency component of collective action frames” (Benford & Snow,
2000, p. 617). Here the populist puts to task their own social capital, their own language
and style, which in turn gains further political opportunity through resource mobilization.
One’s charismatic character, hyperbolic rhetoric and positioning in part determines a
frame’s efficiency and effectiveness “to garner bystander support and to demobilize
antagonists” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).
Aslanidis (2018) argues “that the inclusive identity of 'the people' and its
contentious juxtaposition against sociopolitical and economic 'elites' allowed activists to
mobilize diffuse sentiments in favor of the value of popular sovereignty and unite disparate
grievances in society toward joint action” (p. 444). In doing so, he brings the worlds of
populist rhetoric and the collective action frames of social movements together. If Aslanidis
can use populist theory to help explain the social movements of the Great Recession, then
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certainly, we can use the framing tasks of social movement theory to help explain the
populism of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries.
All definitions imply some sort of construction in terms of selection or the actual
creation of a reality that works in favor of the framer’s interest. The idea behind frame
analysis then is that if something is socially constructed, it should then be able to be
deconstructed, studied and even counted. The purpose then of a frame analysis “is to
reconstruct the underlying, culturally embedded frames in a text” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 93).
The term frame analysis was first coined by Erving Goffman in his 1974 writing of
the same title. Goffman saw frames as a means of people making sense of and defining
certain phenomenon – usually through exposure of specific events, and the subsequent
conscious or subconscious organization of information. To him, “frame analysis is a slogan
to refer to the examination … of the organization of experience” (Goffman, 1974, p. 11).
Thanks to the work of Benford and Snow, this approach has since been pushed from
“cognition … toward collective and organization processes appropriate to mobilization”
(Johnston, 1995, p. 217). In other words the purpose of frames was to no longer merely
organize experiences in order to make sense of something, but to move people toward
action based on a frame’s resonance. If Goffman was the first one to consider frame
analysis in the work of meaning making, then Benford and Snow were the 2.0 version of
the same.
Counter Frames
It is important to note that those on the recipient end of blame, or those who disagree
with a frame’s intent or context, do not simply remain docile in the process. Indeed there
are those who reject and seek to challenge the frame, and in the process may come up with

©2019, Nancy Duffy

30

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

their own. This oppositional response is known as counter-framing where there is a
concerted effort to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions
of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626). Oppositional
responses within the same movement or party are referred to as “framing disputes” or
“framing contests” (p. 625-626). The very process then of framing itself, is therefore
argumentative, which may only add to further complicate the already contentious politics
it purports to fix (p. 614).
I should note that while challengers or counter-frame actors can include anyone
who disagrees with a frame, for the purposes of this research, due to the limited scope of
this research design, the only possible counter frames that become part of the analysis, are
those produced by the establishment candidacies within the 2016 primary debates.
In Keeping with the Cycle of Protest
Aslanidis cautions that in the interest of empirical integrity, when doing a master
frame analysis, the context should be in keeping with the cycle of protest (Aslanidis, 2018,
p. 446). If a cycle of protest is defined as “a phase of heightened conflict across the social
system, with rapid diffusion of collective action … and sequences of intensified
information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (Aslanidis, p. 446),
then 2016 could perhaps qualify as a new cycle of protest of an old movement.
This claim, however, would not be without its challengers. In 2013 for instance,
Calhoun writes: “But for the most part there is relatively little reason to expect continuity
in [Occupy Wall Street] as such… It will not be just ‘Occupy Again’ but something new,
sparked by its own exciting innovations, giving voice to new participants and new visions”
(Calhoun, 2013, p. 27). But branding something by a different name does not make it new.
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Calhoun is right in that the 2016 cycle was not called Occupy, but its grievances remained;
and its framing, at least by one populist, certainly maintained the use of the same Occupy
slogans (see empirical portion).
The Establishment Arena
The establishment arena within the context and purposes of this research, represents
the traditional political ‘primary’ process of choosing presidential candidates. It is referred
to as the establishment, or more precisely, the electoral arena because there are traditional
ways a politician comes to be a candidate in the primaries – including shared ways of
campaign funding, the binary profession of Republican or Democrat ideology, and the
declared support of their respective issues. Theodore Windt describes the ‘establishment
arena’ well, defining it as “the arena of political reality within which political thought and
action take place… [that] in the United States … presidents set the initial terms for
argument about issues and politics. Their messages create the arenas in which others will
do rhetorical and political battle” (Windt, 1990, p. 3).
Participating within the electoral or establishment arena may have special rhetorical
framing considerations as well. As suggested by McCarthy et al. (1996) an effective frame
requires the rhetorical talents of the framer, especially when it pertains to breaking past the
‘gatekeepers’ of the electoral arena – those charged with trying to protect against the entry
of outsiders. Within this context, McCarthy informs us that “the discourse in different
arenas may well require more elaborated plans and programs if they are to be convincing
to gatekeepers… the rhetorical quality of frames is crucial to their success” (McCarthy,
Smith, Zald, 1996, p. 311).
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Establishment v. Anti-Establishment Candidacies
The next concept that requires definition comes in two parts, the establishment
versus the anti-establishment and their respective candidates. The 2016 American primary
elections brought notoriety to the contrast in terms, where headlines gave credence to the
notion that a counter-establishment movement was on the rise. Here are just a few headline
examples:
This campaign is a mortal threat to their grip on the establishment…We
need to teach the Republican establishment a lesson… The Republican
establishment is…determined to stop us... The Establishment Tries to Exert
What Influence It Has Against Gingrich… (Serazio, 2016, p. 181).
There is a consensus among the literature as to what constitutes an establishment
candidate and/or party. But there is variance on what constitutes the anti-establishment. In
first defining establishment party I defer to a study by Amir Abedi, who “measures
establishment by the governing potential of a party and its actual governmental relevance”
(Abedi, 2004, p. 11). For the purpose of this research, establishment (and/or establishment
candidate) is defined as “first, all those parties that have participated in government or
alternatively those parties that the governing parties regard as suitable partners for
government formation, and second, parties that are willing to cooperate with the main
governing parties by joining them in a coalition government” (Abedi, 2004, p. 11).
To help define anti-establishment parties and persons, Abedi comes up with a threepart criterion, whereby all parts must be true. An anti-establishment party, and for the
purposes of this study, an-anti-establishment candidate, is:
[a] party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and
political system issues; [a] party that perceives itself as a challenger to the
parties that make up the political establishment; [and finally, a] party that
asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political
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establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment
parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same
(Abedi, 2004, p. 11).
Robert Barr (2009) talks of the expression of anti-establishment sentiments as those
which “claim that the power elite are unable or unwilling to represent ordinary citizens”
(p. 31). In this sense, Anti-establishment candidates do not simply wish to replace the
political elite, but to affect change in the entire system. In doing so they utilize “a specific
rhetorical appeal…where political actors attempt to gain support through an ‘us versus
them’ discourse” (Barr, 2009, p. 31). In this description, we can once again see the system
of framing at work.
In a viewpoint that differs from other scholars, Schedler (1996) writes, that “[a]ntipolitical-establishment actors declare war on the political class” (p. 293). To him, antiestablishment is less about outsiders going against establishment government, but more so
about those aggressively opposing those who appear in control of the overall system in a
way that controls and prevents the success of others. “Its main thrust has been anticapitalist, anti-oligarchic, or anti-imperialist. In sum, where anti-political-establishment
actors carry populist banners, they do so in a qualified way; they engage in anti-political
populism” (p. 293). For all the things that have generally been suggested of the antiestablishment candidate, Schedler, nearly alone in his judgement, is right to caution us that
“unless we always choose to take sides for the status quo, we must first assess the
underlying empirical realities before we judge anti-political diagnoses of irrationality to be
irrational themselves” (p. 297).
In a more partisan view, Serazio (2016) makes the argument that it is primarily antiestablishment actors that “strategically harness resentment against the unfair conditions of
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contemporary privilege and power” (p. 188). To Serazio, where the left properly names
their establishment foes, in the case of the Occupy Movement, “the villainous one percent,”
the right, he points out, names no one really; that the enemy, rather, is somewhat imagined
- the “boogeyman or party to that secret cabal… naturally [stopping] shy of such an outright
confrontation”(p. 188).

Why it All Matters
Why should we care about populism? Because it appears to only show up when
everything else has gone wrong. If establishment failed to listen when thousands upon
thousands of people lined the streets and occupied public spaces in 2011 in cities around
the world, what will they listen to? Maybe if the movements would have been more clear
perhaps, but how much clearer can you get than a four-word slogan? The framing by the
populists during 2016 not only served as a movement-maker, it actually served as a
president-maker. But a frame is only as powerful as its audience is vulnerable to fear and
hope. And so when the frame is working, it can only mean that times are that dire. People’s
experiential knowledge deserves recognition. And they should not have to wait for some
populist to put what they are feeling into words on their behalf. When establishment and
social movements fail, people had better hope that the next best solution is on their side.
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CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS
Scope of Analysis
This research design entails the execution of a populist master frame analysis of the
2016 American presidential debates, beginning from August 2015 to April 2016 (see
Appendices B and C). This process illustrates how the populist master frame was used by
anti-establishment candidates in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment
candidacies. Grievances of the social movements of the Great Recession (Appendix K) as
well as results from a 2016 Pew Research report (Appendix I) are also considered.

The Candidates
For this study, the following will represent the anti-establishment candidates whose
2016 debate rhetoric will undergo a frame analysis: Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, and
Ted Cruz. Those designated as ‘establishment candidates’ within this research, for reasons
of their families’ longevity within the establishment arena, as well as their own political
record, are Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush. The latter two need no further explanation as to
why they should represent ‘establishment’ candidacies. An explanation for the inclusion of
Sanders, Trump, and Cruz is outlined below.
Trump proves his position as an anti-establishment candidate for a number of
reasons. His first bout in politics came on the tails of Ross Perot's run for the presidency in
the mid-1990s, when he fought to lead the new Reform Party. Insecure about the party's
future, and after dropping out of the race, Trump implies his anti-establishment status when
saying, “he regretted not being able to run a race against Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore, two
establishment politicians” (quoted in Judis, 2016, p. 72). When asked by a reporter from
Bloomberg Businessweek about the future of the Republican party, Trump responded,
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“Five, ten years from now - different party. You're going to have a worker's party. A party
of people that haven't had a real wage increase in eighteen years, that are angry” (p. 77).
These were not the thoughts of someone embedded in establishment ideals, even if he is
solidly embedded as a member of the economic elite.
Like Trump, Bernie Sanders' debut in politics lay outside the establishment.
“Sanders ran for Senate twice and governor twice in the '70s on the ticket of the Liberty
Union, a leftwing third party in Vermont” (Judis, 2016, p. 78). Having failed miserably in
his bid for higher office, Sanders finally found success in municipal politics (Judis, 2016,
p. 79). Municipal wins garnered Sanders the experience and name recognition that would
later help propel him to the House of Representatives and eventually, the Senate – all the
while remaining an independent candidate. Though he first self-identified as a “radical and
socialist,” (Clendinen, 1982, p. L24), Sanders now describes himself a democratic-socialist
(Weigel & Fahrenthold, 2015, p. 2).
And lastly, because John Dickerson (2013) called him “a populist egghead” (p. 1),
I include Ted Cruz on my list of anti-establishment candidates. Having had roots (still
present) in the populist Tea Party, Dickerson described Cruz’ entry to Washington as “an
anti-establishment bolt from the blue, having defeated the GOP’s preferred nominee in his
first Senate race” (p. 1). A lot has happened with Ted Cruz since 2013, namely, he fell short
of winning the candidacy in 2016 perhaps because he was not anti-establishment enough;
or perhaps his rhetorical skill could not stand in comparison to that of his challenger’s. For
the purposes of this study, I maintain the use of Cruz as an anti-establishment candidate,
precisely because his brand of populism failed: “despite his highly praised and far superior
ground organization, Cruz was outperformed by Trump” (Mast, 2017, p. 467).
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The following is a summary of the candidates whose rhetoric, during the 2016
Primary debates, will be reviewed as part of this populist master frame analysis (see Figure
1):
Anti-Establishment Candidates
Donald Trump
Though non-establishment,
Donald Trump comes from within
the establishment and garners
enough support to become the
leader of the Republican Party.

Ted Cruz (Quasi)
With informal ties to and
originating from the Tea
Party, Cruz remains an
outsider within establishment
politics.

Bernie Sanders
An anti-establishment candidate
working within the establishment
as a sitting senator. Though
unsuccessful in his attempt to lead
the Democratic Party, Sanders
was able to garner widespread
support.

Establishment Candidates
Jeb Bush
During this campaign Jeb Bush represented ‘old
establishment’ – including his chosen style of
debate in stark contrast to Trump’s charismatic
character.

Hillary Clinton
Represents globalization’s push for more open
markets, and ‘more good jobs.’ Insists that
America is already great – while fringe voters ask,
“Great for who?”

Figure 1. Anti-Establishment & Establishment Candidates

Data Collection
This design was inspired by the methodology in Paris Aslanidis’ (2018) master
frame analysis of the 2011 social movements. Within his study, Aslanidis looked at the
manifestos of the social movements of the Great Recession. Since my work is a case study
of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuation of the politics of the Great
Recession, I will be looking at the framing rhetoric of anti-establishment/establishment
candidates during the primaries (as identified above) but in keeping with the same
methodology as the Aslanidis’ 2018 study.
Official transcripts of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries were sourced from
the New York Times, Time Magazine, and The Washington Post. Video links of the full
debates were also sourced through formal channels on YouTube to help provide context
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and/or clarification pertaining to the transcripts when necessary. To be clear, video links
were for clarification only, the actual analysis is indeed limited to the transcripts.
I chose transcripts for this analysis to witness how candidates frame their stance
among opposition candidates so as to exclude, as much as possible, the framing influence
of the media. As Gamson (1992) writes, “[f]rames that are present in social movement
discourse but are invisible in mass media commentary rarely find their way into
conversations. Systemic omissions make certain ways of framing issues extremely
unlikely” (p. 6). By looking directly at words and phrases uninterrupted by media
discourse, I can better analyze context, intent and frame applicability.
Each transcript was printed to a PDF from its original news source, then
downloaded and converted into a word document, where line numbers were added to
properly conduct the frame analysis. Data sources for all the material used in this study
have been curated and documented, inclusive of links, debate dates, locations, participant
and moderator names (See Appendices A and B).
One of the challenges that Aslanidis (2018) came across in his study was with the
issue of agency during the empirical prognostic framing process (p. 452). The challenge
was that the social movements of the Great Recession prided themselves on their nonhierarchical style of leadership. There is no such concern for this case study of the 2016
American Presidential Primaries, as the candidates were their own agency in continuing
their cycles of protest, not yet chosen by the people as representatives of “the movement.”
The challenge that this research does present, however, is simply in its size. Because
Aslanidis (2018) limited his scope to the manifestos of the movement subjects, the amount
of lines identified as grievances were limited in findings (p. 450, see also Appendix K).
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Since the data I am considering is a bit larger, with back and forth dialogue between
candidates, as well as opening and closing statements over a period of 20 debates, the
transcript material extrapolates into a far greater number of documented ‘lines’ in the
analysis. I will do my best to illustrate the findings in a way that can be easily viewed,
despite the size of transcriptions.
Methodology
This research design has three parts. The first is the master frame analysis of the
2016 American Primary debates, including the necessary inductive and deductive phases.
In the second part of the design, the findings of part one will be compared to the 2016 Pew
Research report findings, which polled the top issues that concerned voters during the 2016
election (Appendix I). And lastly, the findings of the master frame analysis are then
compared to a similar and prior study on the social movements of the Great Recession
(Appendix K).
The research design of the master frame analysis follows the major framing tasks
of social movements as suggested by Benford and Snow (2000) combined with Goffman’s
(1974) influence in looking at the meaning making work of cognition. In this process I first
conduct an inductive framing analysis on all of the subjects’ speaking parts within the
official transcripts of the 2016 debates. For this phase I follow the practical instructions of
Baldwin Van Gorp (2010) who suggests that “the intention of an inductive framing analysis
is to reconstruct the frames that are useful to define a certain topic” (p. 92). From here I am
able to assess the totality of the content for themes according to Benford and Snow’s (2000)
framing tasks.

©2019, Nancy Duffy

40

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

This means I am looking at how the candidacies positioned what they were saying
according to the major framing tasks of the diagnostic frame (identifying a grievance and
who or what the candidate is ascribing blame to for the grievance); the prognostic frame (a
declaration of the necessary solutions), and the motivational frame (devices motivating
bystanders and voters to action) (Benford & Snow, 2000). The framing and reasoning
devices used by each candidate are identified to help indicate “the presence of the frame in
a subsequent deductive phase, thus limiting, or even eliminating, subjectivity from the
framing analysis” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 92).
Grievances, perpetrators and subsequent solutions as well as framing devices are
then identified and coded into a frame matrix. Once the matrix of the inductive phase is
complete, I move to the deductive phase. This phase “is based on principles of doing
quantitative content analysis which deal with measuring the extent to which inductively
reconstructed frame packages are actually applied in a representative sample of texts” (Van
Gorp, 2010, p. 99). In this phase I look for “clusters in the coded devices,” (p. 100) where
framing findings within the inductive phase can be grouped into larger themes. For
example, specifically named businesses who are being blamed for a grievance (i.e. AIG
Corp) can be deducted into being part of a perpetrator group called ‘corporations.’
Once the inductive and deductive phases are complete, I am ready to prepare the
master analysis where I compare grievances, blame, prognosis and devices across all
debates and all selected candidates, again deducting findings into larger themes where
deemed appropriate.
There will then be a comparison of the 2016 master frame analysis and the Pew
Research findings that polled American voters on what they thought the top issues were for
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2016. Here I will discuss how these issues relate back to those framed by the candidacies
of the same time. My hypothesis here is that the top grievances found in my master frame
analysis will closely resemble those identified in the Pew Research poll.
And lastly, the research findings of the master frame analysis of the 2016 American
Presidential Primaries and the anti-establishment candidacies are then compared to the
findings of the 2018 Aslanidis master frame analysis of the social movements of the Great
Recession (Appendix K). My hypothesis is that many of the grievances identified during
the 2011 social movements, will be the same as those identified by the populists of the
2016 American Presidential Primaries.
Debate Sources and Other Considerations

Please note that when I refer to ‘points’ within the results and discussion portion of
this paper, I am referring to percentage points. Since grievances and perpetrators within the
frame were looked at first, qualitatively to code the frame, and then quantitatively to
surmise issue categories, the points refer to the percentage of the named issue in relation
to other candidates.
Debates and line numbers referred to herein are coded first according to party and
then line number. For example: (R01, 237) refers to the first Republican debate, line
number 237. Another example: (D09, 1290) refers to the ninth Democratic debate, line
number 1290. A separate bibliography for debate transcript citations are listed according to
debate number after the main bibliography under the heading “Cited Transcripts.”

©2019, Nancy Duffy

42

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

CHAPTER IV. RESULTS
The populist master frame deployed during this period allowed for a wide array of
grievances as well as their blame attribution. The primary populist candidates of Donald
Trump and Bernie Sanders came in top for nearly every grievance, meaning, nearly every
grievance identified within the frame analysis had either Sanders or Trump as its main
champion. The rhetoric opened new opportunities for defense and opposing opinions, but
also drove the agenda of the debates, sometimes with the assistance of moderators.
Undeniably framing contests took place between candidates within the debates. A further
breakdown follows.

Grievances
The overall results of the diagnostic frame shows that the top grievances in the 2016
American Presidential Primaries were first, the economy (or economic system), followed
closely by national and international security concerns, then by corruption, rights and
discrimination and so on (see Figure 2 below and Appendix I for more details). The overall
data is interesting in itself, which I will discuss later. But when further unpacking the
findings, we can see how certain grievances presented themselves in comparison between
establishment and anti-establishment candidacies.
Top Grievances Named by Candidates During the
2016 American Presidential Primaries
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Figure 2. Top Grievances Named by Candidates, 2016 American Primaries
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The top grievances bifurcated between anti-establishment and establishment
candidacies (see Appendices C and D, Figures 3, 7) where the top three concerns for antiestablishment candidates were Economy (including economic system), National and
International Security (herein referred to as ‘security’) and Corruption. If we look at the
candidates individually, Trump and Cruz championed security as their top grievance which
included the issue of a diminishing military, followed by economy and then corruption.
Sanders on the other hand had economy as his highest grievance followed by corruption
and then rights and discrimination.
Establishment candidates were nearly tied between security and economy.
Economy and rights and discrimination were nearly equal as the top grievance identified
by Clinton, followed by security. Bush’s grievances were primarily focused on security
followed loosely by economy. If we look at candidates according to party, however, we see
that both Sanders and Clinton agree that economy is a top grievance but differ greatly on
the issue of corruption. It is barely present as an issue with Clinton (Appendix D, Figure
9). On the Republican side while all three candidates agree that security and economy are
top issues, only Trump and Cruz (Figures 6, 7) indicate corruption as a grievance. Like
Clinton, it falls as almost a non-issue for Bush (Appendix D, Figure 10). This data clearly
supports the notion that establishment candidates rarely point to corruption as a grievance,
a stark contrast to those working outside establishment norms. I break down the results by
category below.
Economy

Beginning with the economy, this was a category that was expanded to include
other grievances through the deductive process. The big issues of trade and its impact on
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jobs, unemployment and low, stagnating wages were included under the overall economic
category as all of these issues relate to the people’s experiential knowledge of what is
perceived to affect their immediate economy. Poor trade policy brought up as a grievance
(and later as a perpetrator as well) affecting American jobs is very much an economic issue.
The economy not being able to employ people or low wages, which affect how people
spend money all ultimately fall under the ‘master’ grievance of the economy. Even so, data
was gathered within each of these categories; granting further revelation (see Figure 10,
Economic Grievances, Combined, and Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown).
The biggest champion of pushing the economy in general as a top grievance was
Bernie Sanders, followed by Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz and finally, Jeb
Bush (in that order). For trade, as it relates to jobs and the economy, the main champion of
this grievance fell to Donald Trump who led the issue by 15 points ahead of Bernie Sanders.
Talk of trade and the related jobs as a grievance then drops significantly with Ted Cruz
leading ahead of Hillary Clinton followed by Jeb Bush. Hereafter I will refer to the
candidates by last name only.
The terms ‘Unemployment and Underemployment’ made up part of Sanders’
framing devices and so it is no surprise that he led the task of raising the issue as a grievance
by more than 27 points ahead of the nearest challenger, Cruz. This does not mean that the
other candidates did not think unemployment was an issue, but that they chose to frame the
issue another way – as covered under jobs related to trade for example. The same thing
happened with naming the issue of ‘lower, stagnant wages’ as a grievance, where once
again Bernie Sanders acted as the main champion with a stark difference between himself

©2019, Nancy Duffy

45

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

and the remaining candidates leading by 70 points. The economy overall, however faired
as the most significant grievance framed during the 2016 American primary debates.
National / International Security

The grievances under this category include national and international security in
general (incorporating a perceived military in decline), foreign relations, and terrorism. On
this issue, there is definitely a division of support along the lines of ideology as opposed to
merely establishment versus anti-establishment lines (see Appendix F).
Foreign policy was framed most often as an issue of grievance by Sanders and
Trump within just 3 points of each other while establishment candidates, Clinton and Bush
lagged a full 11 and 19 points respectively, behind Sanders. When we look more
specifically at the grievances of the condition of the military, and more generally at national
and international security, Trump is the greatest identifier, followed by Cruz 19 points
behind, then Bush and Clinton. No mention of this particular grievance was made by
Sanders. Here we clearly see a demarcation in the naming of grievances according to
ideology mixed in with an anti-establishment sentiment that I shall discuss later. The final
grievance falling under the category of foreign policy is terrorism with grievance-namingsupport across the board by all candidates, however the establishment candidacies fell
behind the populists in naming it as a grievance.
Corruption

Corruption, as expected, shows the greatest amount of disparity between
establishment and anti-establishment candidates (see Appendix G, Figure 12). Bernie
Sanders led the charge of corruption as a grievance at 45 points, nearly doubling Donald
Trump next in line, followed by Ted Cruz. As expected, the establishment candidacies of
Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush, had little mention of corruption. The overall grievance of
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corruption was identified primarily by anti-establishment candidates throughout the
debates under the subcategories of an ‘unjust or corrupt democratic process,’ as a charge
against ‘establishment politics,’ the ‘establishment’ or as ‘waste, fraud and abuse of
resources.’ Framing devices were heavily employed, specifically by Sanders on this issue.
He used it as a means of arguing nearly every other grievance with the reasoning that, “very
little is going to be done to transform our economy and to create the kind of middle class
we need unless we end a corrupt campaign ﬁnance system which is undermining American
democracy” (D04, 1454-1456) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 43).
Rights and Discrimination

Continuing in order of saliency among candidates, rights and discrimination falls
into fourth place among the top grievances (see Appendix G, Figure 13). Because
discrimination and inequality (excluding any discussion of general economic inequality,
which was reserved under ‘economy’) is so closely tied to rights, these two issues were
deduced into one and included the subcategories of: discrimination (racism, sexism, gender
inequality, etc.) and rights (constitutional, women’s, paid family leave, pro-choice, prolife, property, religious liberty, veterans and work/union). Although I grouped these two
together, I will break down the results here so as to reveal right and left leanings as well as
differentials in establishment versus non-establishment candidacies which I will take up in
Chapter V. Beginning with Rights, there is concern about rights across all candidates led
by Sanders at 30 points followed by Clinton, 9 points behind.
With respect to Discrimination and Inequality, we see much more of an ideological
disparity as opposed to one of establishment versus anti-establishment. Hillary Clinton
leads in this category at 48 points followed closely by Sanders at 42. The Republican side
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of the debates, however, showed almost no concern for this particular grievance (see Figure
13, Appendix G).

Healthcare as An Issue of Access v. An Economic Hinderance

Healthcare was a top issue for both sides of the aisle, equally important for antiestablishment and establishment candidacies but for different reasons. On the Democrat
side Sanders led the issue by nearly 10 points over Clinton. The contention between these
candidates was in Sanders championing the need for a new single payer system, where
Clinton wanted to build on the existing system.
On the side of the Republicans, Trump led the issue, but all Republican candidates
were in favour of repealing Obamacare. Bush wanted the responsibility of healthcare to
solely be designated back to the states and Trump wanted something entirely new with the
promise that he would take care of those who could not take care of themselves. All
Republican candidates saw the existing system as a strain on the economy (see Figure 14).
Immigration

Immigration was a much hotter grievance for Donald Trump leading 12 points
ahead of Clinton on the issue, although both candidates are in support of immigration
reform. This is another instance where ideology makes a clear demarcation (see Figure 15).
On the Democrat side of the debate Clinton and Sanders want immigration reform with a
path toward citizenship for persons currently without status in the United States. Clinton’s
support of immigration as a grievance is slightly higher than Sanders which fits in well
with the backing of rights and discrimination as her prominent campaign issue.
Donald Trump on the other hand uses a controversial populist frame to make his
case to build a wall, and to move toward the deportation of ‘illegal immigrants.’ He frames
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the issue as one of security with a call for a nostalgic ideal: “So, we have a country of laws,
they're going to go out, and they'll come back if they deserve to come back. If they've had
a bad record, if they've been arrested, if they've been in jail, they're never coming back.
We're going to have a country again” (R01, 1078-1081) (Washington Post, 2015, August
5, p. 33). Trump also often pairs his stance on immigration as an issue of state sovereignty
through this reasoning device: “I have a very hardline position; we have a country or we
don't have a country” (R05, 1552-1553) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 45) (the
sentiments of which are also mentioned in R02, 1071, 1078; R03, 1367; and R04, 387, 397398).
And of course the top prognostic frame offered by Trump as a solution to the issue
of ‘illegal’ immigration is to “Build a Wall” (R01, 394) (Washington Post, 2015, August
5, p. 14) which is mentioned repeatedly throughout the debates. Several mentions were
also made of fitting the bill of the wall’s construction to Mexico (also in R02, 1065; R03,
139, 145; R04, 388; R05, 177, 1555; R08, 1685-1686; R09, 913; R10, 411-432, 2328; R11,
634, 635).
Division and Rhetoric

This was an interesting grievance that had made it into the debates with support at
various levels across the board but meaning different things to establishment versus antiestablishment candidates (see Figure 16). For Trump and Cruz, rhetoric was brought up as
a grievance in the form of political correctness. To them, the ability to operate loose rhetoric
gave them the freedom for a more colourful dialogue; de-sanitizing the political correctness
of the establishment. For Trump, it was about not having time to be politically correct,
while for Cruz rhetoric was a way to accuse the other side of not being brave enough to

©2019, Nancy Duffy

49

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

call things as he thought they were: “I want to speak to all the moms and dads whose sons
and daughters are fighting for this country, and the incredible sense of betrayal when you
have a commander-in-chief who will not even speak the name of our enemy, radical Islamic
terrorism” (R06, 1965-1973) (Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 60).
Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton indicated rhetoric as a grievance of division in stark
contrast to political correctness, with Jeb often referring to Trump as ‘Divider-in-Chief’
during opening and closing statements of the debates: “The Armed Forces Radio is here
listening to this today. I hope they know that if I'm president, I'll be a commander-in-chief,
not an agitator-in-chief or a divider-in-chief” (R05, 1335-1337) (Washington Post, 2015,
December 15, p. 39). The implication is a passive-aggressive attempt at insult with little
effect.
Before the very first debate had begun, Jeb Bush had made a public comment about
Donald Trump’s divisive tone that had made the news. The question of rhetoric entered the
electoral arena during the debate at the behest of moderator, Megyn Kelly. A question was
first posed to Bush and then again to Trump. Trump’s response was framed in such a way
that tone was nothing in comparison to the urgent grievance of terrorism:
The one thing he did say about me, however, was my tone. And I also
understand that. But when you have people that are cutting Christians' heads
off, when you have a world that the border and at so many places, that it is
medieval times, we've never – it almost has to be as bad as it ever was in
terms of the violence and the horror, we don't have time for tone. We have
to go out and get the job done (R01, 1321-1326) (Washington Post, 2015,
August 6, p. 40).
Trump’s rhetoric from news reports and rallies often made their way into the
electoral arena in the form of moderator questions during the debates. For example, Jake
Tapper posed this question to Trump and then later asked the same question of Marco
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Rubio: “Last night, you told CNN quote, “Islam hates us?” Did you mean all 1.6 billion
Muslims?” (R12, 736-738) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 20). Correcting
himself to the term of ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ Trump used framing to blame ‘political
correctness’ for getting in the way of dealing with what he had earlier termed as hate: “Now
you can say what you want, and you can be politically correct if you want. I don’t want
to be so politically correct. I like to solve problems. We have a serious, serious problem
of hate” (R12, 776-778) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 21). The charge of political
correctness “frequently got [Trump] out of tight spots during interviews and demonstrates
how far he managed to stretch the ‘Overton Window’ of acceptable public discourse”
(Kaufman, 2019, p. 118).
Trump’s rhetoric was such a topic during the overall primary season that during the
fifth Republican debate a frustrated Trump questioned moderators about why their
questions were always about what he says and how he says it:
I think it's very sad that CNN leads Jeb Bush, Governor Bush, down a road
by starting off virtually all the questions, “Mr. Trump this, Mister” -- I think
it's very sad. And, frankly, I watched -- I think it's very sad. And, frankly, I
watched the first debate, and the first long number of questions were, “Mr.
Trump said this, Mr. Trump said that. Mr. Trump”– these poor guys … I
thought it was very unfair that virtually the entire early portion of the debate
was Trump this, Trump that, in order to get ratings, I guess (R05, 13401349) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 39).
For Sanders, Trump’s rhetoric was simply something of an irritation when brought
up by other candidates or moderators; getting back to his primary framing device was key:
“All of us have denounced Trump’s attempts to divide this country: the anti‑Latino rhetoric,
the racist rhetoric, the anti‑Muslim rhetoric. But where I disagree with you, Governor
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O’Malley, is I do believe we have to deal with the fundamental issues of a handful of
billionaires…” (D04, 629-633) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 19).
Infrastructure

“Crumbling infrastructure” (a framing device used by Sanders throughout the 2016
debates) became a euphemism for ‘build it and get the economic boost and jobs that come
with it.’ Addressing the infrastructure issue was a means of creating new jobs while also
fixing something that had clearly been ignored over the years (see Figure 17) (D01, line
1041; D02, line 968; D03, line 825; D04, 93, 579, 843, D05, 188-189, 1390, D06, 106109, 228, D07, 70, 154, 217, and D08, line 915). This was an issue especially highlighted
during the debate hosted in Flint, Michigan, where the spotlight was heavily placed on the
Flint Water Crisis by both candidates and debate moderators. During the debate in Flint,
the grievance of infrastructure, however, was quickly linked to one of discrimination and
inequality – an underlying systemic racism that made cutting corners on something as
important as water even possible:
One wonders if this were a white suburban community what kind of
response there would have been… Flint, Michigan, is a poor community. It
is disproportionately African‑American and minority. And what has
happened there is absolutely unacceptable (D05, 1264-1266) (New York
Times, 2016, February 5, p, 35).
Education, Both A Grievance and Solution

The ideological battle over education is a battle of Democrats wanting the quality
of education to be controlled at the federal level in order to improve it at the local level,
and the Republicans wanting to turn that responsibility and ‘say so’ back to the state level.
The Republicans have a consensus on the issue. The Democrats do not (see Figure 18).
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The establishment versus anti-establishment battle about education exists on the
Democrat side only, and as a nuanced argument on behalf of Sanders that today’s
educational requirements at the college level, are what was expected years ago at the basic
high school level, and therefore should be free for everyone. To pay for it, he suggests that
a speculation tax, which was mentioned multiple times throughout each of the debates:
“…we are going to have a tax on Wall Street speculation, which will bring in more than
enough money to provide free tuition at public colleges and universities and lower the
outrageous level of student debt” (D09, 1289-1291, p. 37).
The support for education changes from a grievance (too expensive, should be free)
to a solution for discrimination and criminal justice reform. What started out in the first
debate as this: “It seems to me that instead of building more jails and providing more
incarceration, maybe – just maybe – we should be putting money into education and jobs
for our kids” (D01, 125-127) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4) turns into the
slogan of “Jobs and education, not jails and incarceration” (D04, 253-254) (New York
Times, 2016, January 18, p. 8).
Climate Change

Climate change was a completely one-sided grievance on the part of the Democrats,
but within that camp, how climate change was framed varied greatly. To Sanders climate
change was elevated to global security status and was an issue that should be fought in the
same way that a country prepares to go to war:
You know, if we, God forbid, were attacked tomorrow the whole country
would rise up and say we got an enemy out there and we got to do something
about it. That was what 9/11 was about. We have an enemy out there, and
that enemy is going to cause drought and ﬂoods and extreme weather
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disturbances. There’s going to be international conﬂict (D09, 791-799)
(New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 23).
Clinton on the other hand, frames climate change as an opportunity for green jobs;
and although she supports fracking, she waits until the final debate to clarify her support
of fracking as only a bridge: “I don’t think I’ve changed my view on what we need to do
to go from where we are, where the world is heavily dependent on coal and oil, but
principally coal, to where we need to be, which is clean renewable energy, and one of the
bridge fuels is natural gas” (D09, 866-869) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 25). On
the Republican side, in opposition to any movement on climate change, establishment
candidate Jeb Bush says that the United States needs to “embrace the energy revolution in
our country” (R01, 991) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 30); the energy revolution
meaning natural gas and the XL pipelines.
The framing analysis (see Figure 21) points to climate change as both a grievance,
but also as a perpetrator. There are a few instances within this study that make this similar
transition and it depends on how the issue is framed. Though the issue of education, for
example, was identified as a grievance by some, it was also presented as a solution to
another grievance by others. In the case of climate change, on the one hand for Sanders it
is a grave threat to humanity, although, not big enough that it sits as his top grievance.
Again, his strategic logic is that if you do not fix a corrupt system, you will not be able to
fix anything. Still within the diagnostic frame, Sanders also sees climate change as a source
of blame as well as a grievance. When questioned by Dickerson if he still believed that “the
greatest threat to national security was climate change,” Sanders responded:
Absolutely. In fact, climate change is directly related to the growth of
terrorism. And if we do not get our act together and listen to what the
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scientists say, you're going to see countries all over the world – this is what
the CIA says – they're going to be struggling over limited amounts of water,
limited amounts of land to grow their crops ask you're going to see all kinds
of international conflict (D02, 117-121) (Washington Post, 2015, p. 4).
Timing and Other Issues

The issues of social security and democratic participation fell more to party lines
than to disparities between establishment and anti-establishment framing (Figures 21, 24).
Democratic participation was brought up the least and was mostly one-sided with its
biggest champion being Bernie Sanders. Supreme Court Choice reached salience as an
issue at the passing of Justice Scalia in February 2016. Candidates debated if President
Barack Obama should or could have someone appointed before the next election. Debate
discussions then became about the sort of litmus tests that potential appointees would have
to pass in order to earn their respective appointments. For Ted Cruz, the litmus test was
about constitutional integrity, specifically about religious rights. For the Democrat camp,
the litmus test had to do with the willingness to overturn Citizens United.
Certain grievances, like the supreme court choice, terrorism or foreign policy,
spiked according to events of the new cycle. The news cycle therefore had an influence on
the grievances and perpetrators of the day as they were brought up and discussed during
the debates by moderators, but also in opening and closing remarks by candidates. While
on the top of the news cycle, the media itself was brought up by the populists – this before
becoming Trump’s ‘enemy of the people.’ They were served up as more of a perpetrator,
though not in any significant way. The data, however, shows that all three populist
candidates took issue with the media, usually in the context of not reporting on the real
news (see Figure 35).
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Perpetrators
The top four perpetrators blamed for the grievances of 2016 were big business, poor
foreign policy, corruption, government and a ‘rigged’ economic system. Big business
included the subcategories of corporations, the top 1 percent, and any who were identified
as business persons throughout the debate (see Appendix H., Figures 25-29). There is a
spike in business persons by Ted Cruz, as much of his debates were targeted toward Trump
as a businessman who was trying to corrupt the political process through his donations.
Notice in Figure 25, the only one not blaming business persons is Donald Trump. In the
remaining subcategories of big business, we can see the fruits of Sanders’ framing work of
the one percent: “we tell the billionaire class, they cannot have it all. For a start, they're
going to start to pay their fair share of taxes” (D03, 820-821) (Washington Post, 2015,
December 19, p. 22).
Foreign policy received a large spike of interest throughout the debates, again,
relating to the events of the news cycle. In January 2016, for example, the news and image
of U.S. Navy sailors in the kneeling position under arrest by Iranian officials had a
profound effect on Ted Cruz throughout the debate. Security issues, issues of foreign
policy, and terrorism became highly salient:
Today, many of us picked up our newspapers, and we were horrified to see
the sight of 10 American sailors on their knees, with their hands on their
heads. In that State of the Union, President Obama didn't so much as
mention the 10 sailors that had been captured by Iran (R06, 26-29)
(Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 1).
The same thing happened during the news cycle of the Paris bombing in November
2015, and the San Bernadino attack in December 2015. These events especially heightened
nationalist and emotional appeals on the right, where issues of national security, a military
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in decline were brought up as grievances. The main perpetrator of poor foreign policy
decisions primarily related back to the decision to go to war in Iraq, a blame that had
consensus among all populist candidates, but mostly Trump and Sanders (see Appendix H,
Figure 27).
Corruption was often tied to other grievances – a “corrupt criminal justice system”
for instance as framed by Bernie Sanders. But general corruption as a perpetrator was
almost never pointed out or named by establishment candidates (Appendix D, Figure 39).
The perpetrators that had more of a consensus among candidates, but still higher with antiestablishment candidates were the healthcare industry and drug companies, as well as the
economy in general (see Appendix H., Figures 28 and 29).
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION
Name it, blame it, and then propose to change it, is a system that the populist
candidates of 2016-America did very well. It is not as though these anti-establishment
candidacies were necessarily consciously choosing to employ the populist frame while
performing their rhetoric, but almost as though Judis’ (2016) version of populism used as
a type of logic, became innate.
Both grievances and perpetrators were plentiful and again well documented and
almost universally accepted by the public in the framing work already done by the social
movements of the Great Recession. When both Sanders and Trump named a grievance, in
almost every case there was a specifically attributed blame. Their frames, with the use of
persistent reasoning and framing devices remain consistent throughout the primary
debates. The populist candidates did indeed “make populist rhetoric the center of their
campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191).
Establishment Counters the Frame: Diffusion, Deflection, Defense or Denial
When confronted with the rampant depravity of Wall Street and its influence on
establishment politicians, Clinton’s response to Sanders’ framing work was one of three
things: She diffused or deflected the accusation, she defended the actions or character of
existing establishment, or she denied altogether that she was even part of the establishment.
In reaction to accusations, Clinton consistently steered her rhetorical performance away
from the precise naming of grievances, instead opting to go straight to a solution. Rather
than specifically naming blame, Clinton’s attributions (with the exceptions of AIG and
Lehman Brothers), were more abstract in nature:
We’ve talked a lot tonight about what we’re against — we’re against
income inequality. We’re against the abuses of powerful interests. We’re
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against a lot of things. I’m for a lot of things. I don’t want to just stop bad
things from happening, I want to start good things... (D05, 1341-1346)
(New York Times, 2015, February 5, p. 38).
Clinton’s use of ambiguity in labeling what people are against before pivoting to
something new is an attempt at diffusion. Gamson (1995) describes this process whereby
“vague and abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish” (p.
91). Sanders is trying desperately in his framing to point to an injustice, accusing politicians
and SuperPACs for the creation of a corrupt democratic process. Clinton in return tries to
diffuse the accusation (as one who had received SuperPAC funding) by lumping concerns
under the generic titles of ‘inequality ‘and ‘abuses of powerful interests’ without specificity
of a defined culprit. And rather than answer to it, her aim was to redirect the conversation.
If the perpetrator is diffused to a larger than life, immaterial construct, assigning blame in
order to seek some sort of correction or retribution serves to discredit the accuser by making
them appear irrational in their appeal. Gamson (1995) describes this as trying to blame the
rain for ruining the parade and expecting others to do something about it. “When
impersonal and abstract forces are responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept
what cannot be changed and make the best of it” (p. 91).
Another tactic that was used by establishment candidates came in the form of
deflection; accepting blame but then also pointing to another to soften any impending
setback. Gamson (1998) writes that “[i]f reification does not prevent the development of
an injustice frame... accepting human agency while diverting the focus toward external
targets or internal opponents” (p. 91) becomes a strategy.
Instead of addressing job loss and low, stagnating wages credited by Sanders’ to the
charge of “disastrous trade deals” throughout the 2016 Democratic debates, Clinton rarely
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mentions unemployment and low wages. Instead she presses on the issue of creating “more
good jobs” (e.g. D01, 144) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4).
An example where both diffusion and deflection are used in a single response to
Sanders’ harp on Wall Street happens during the sixth Democratic debate, where Clinton
says:
We agree that we’ve got to get unaccountable money out of politics. We
agree that Wall Street should never be allowed to wreck Main Street again.
But here’s the point I want to make tonight. I am not a single‑issue
candidate... I think that a lot of what we have to overcome to break down
the barriers that are holding people back… (D06, 1241-1253) (New York
Times, 2016, p. 32).
Here she concedes that there is a problem with corruption in politics but does not
accept responsibility for it as she frames it as a nearly unsolvable abstraction under the
guise of “unaccountable money.” But then she immediately attempts to change the
conversation from the grievance of Wall Street corruption to one of rights and barriers.
In response to being questioned about being part of a ‘dynastic’ establishment
politics, Bush responded, “I've got a record in Florida. I'm proud of my dad, and I'm
certainly proud of my brother. In Florida, they called me Jeb, because I earned it … I am
my own man” (D01, 160-161) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 5-6). Concerning
accusations of the influence of SuperPACs, Clinton pointed to how President Barack
Obama had raised the most amount of money in history and yet also put into law the
toughest regulations to date on Wall Street in the form of the Dodd-Frank legislation. For
instance during the 7th debate, Clinton countered Sanders’ frame about the corrupt
campaign system with this:
But, the real issue, I think, that the Senator is injecting into this is that if you
had a Super PAC, like President Obama has… If you take donations from
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Wall Street, you can’t be independent. I would just say, I debated thenSenator Obama numerous times on stages like this, and he was the recipient
of the largest number of Wall Street donations of anybody running on the
Democratic side ever. Now, when it mattered, he stood up and took on Wall
Street (D07, 736-742) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 19).
On similar charges of campaign influence, Jeb Bush, simply replies: “I'm not going
to be bought by anybody” after admitting that he took money from Donald Trump, but also
stood against him on casino gambling in Florida (R02, 388-390; 398) (Washington Post,
September 16, p. 12). These responses suggest that Super PACs and corporately funded
campaign funds do not have to interfere with Washington. Clinton’s response uses
establishment past as an illustrative example that despite all the SuperPAC campaign
support held by Obama, when the 2008 recession hit and the housing bubble burst, he
pushed through the Dodd‑Frank regulation, touted as “the toughest regulations since the
1930’s” (D06, 743-744) (New York Times, 2016, February 12, p. 19).
Further defense of establishment came in the form of an implied accusation that
Sanders was playing the gatekeeper role of progressive establishment:
But I’ve heard Senator Sanders comments, and it’s really caused me to
wonder who’s left in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Under
his deﬁnition, President Obama is not progressive because he took
donations from Wall Street; Vice President Biden is not progressive because
he supported Keystone… (D05, 154-159) (New York Times, 2016,
February 5 p. 5).
It is fair to say, Senator, that in your deﬁnition, as you being the
self‑proclaimed gatekeeper for progressivism, I don’t know anyone else
who ﬁts that deﬁnition, but I know a lot of really hard ﬁghting progressives
in the Democratic party who have stood up time, and time again against
special interests… (D05, 237-241) (New York Times, 2016, February 5, p.
7).
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During the final debate Clinton equated an attack on her to an attack on
President Obama again reminding the audience that despite taking SuperPAC support
in 2008, he still came up with the Dodd-Frank legislation to reel in Wall Street. How
dare she be accused of not being able to stand up to Wall Street when her predecessor
had: “Well, make — make no mistake about it, this is not just an attack on me, it’s an
attack on President Obama… [He] took tens of millions of dollars from contributors.
And President Obama was not at all inﬂuenced when he made the decision to pass and
sign Dodd‑Frank…” (D09, 147-153) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 5).
On the occasions that corruption was conceded as a problem, in the case of Clinton,
it was only done so as a grievance of the past, for example: “I went to Wall Street when I
was a United States senator. I told them they were wrecking the economy. I asked for a
moratorium on foreclosures” (D07, 475-476) (New York Times, March 7, p. 15). Such
concessions, however, were followed up with but “now we have tools, laws that we didn’t
have before” (D07, line 510) (New York Times, March 7, p. 16). Attacks against
establishment were downplayed as being mere disagreements that opposition was masking
as corruption: “it’s always a little bit, uh, challenging because, you know, if Senator
Sanders doesn’t agree with how you are approaching something, then you are a member of
the establishment” (D09, 1468-1470) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 42).
When confronted as being part of corrupt establishment by Bernie Sanders, Clinton
denied that she was part of the establishment on at least two occasions – based on her
gender status:
1) “Well, I can't think of anything more of an outsider than electing the first
woman president, but I'm not just running because I would be the first
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woman president” (D01, 1616-1618) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13,
p. 47).
2) “Well, look, I’ve got to just jump in here because, honestly, Senator
Sanders is the only person who I think would characterize me, a woman
running to be the ﬁrst woman president, as exemplifying the establishment”
(D05, 317-319) (New York Times, February 5, p. 9).
3) “I am not a natural politician, in case you haven’t noticed, like my
husband or President Obama. So I have a view that I just have to do the best
I can” (D08, 608-609) (New York Times, March 10, p. 18).
Diagnosing a Growing Insecurity
In the 2019 documentary, “Knock the House Down,” when referring to the struggle
against the establishment of New York, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) says, “This is not
just about Democrat versus Republican, in fact it’s so far away from that. It’s not left and
right, it’s up and down” (Blotnick & Lears, 2019, Time 6:00 min). This, of course, is a
populist statement, and a powerful us versus them framing in regular politics, but one that
is even more potent when trying to get power from within the same party. In this 2018
congressional race, AOC is going against long-time establishment Democrat, Joseph
Crowley. Within this context, a ‘left versus right’ frame within the same party, makes little
sense, and becomes a lot less effective. The same framing logic was evident during the
respective camps of Sanders versus Clinton and Trump versus everyone else running for
Republican leadership.
But who is up and who is down varies according to perspective. The populist who
can tap into the people’s experiential knowledge (Goffman, 1974) will be the one who
drives the up and down frame toward increased political opportunity and ultimate voter
support. Simply put, insecurity and perceived corruption is fodder for populists to use in
identity meaning-making work within the collective action frame – to reach those who have
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been ex-communicated and excluded in a changing economic or societal system. This
means that a Sanders’ and an AOC’s up and down perspective can vary greatly for instance
from that of a Donald Trump (of which I will provide an example shortly).
Referring back to the credibility borrowed by populists from the 2011 social
movements, if people did not feel the experiences that populists described in 2016, populist
candidates would have no legitimacy, no footing and no opportunity to move forward. Most
of the grievances that were made in stark contrast to establishment, involved larger global
structural changes. And so if we look further to the underlying foundations of these
grievances, the populists do, to an extent, have some scholarly support. Academics began
calling attention to structural contention even before the 2011 social movements began –
calling it an “unprecedented phenomenon of exclusion” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71). “The
transformation of world productive structures” were credited for the creation of this
exclusion by “[modifying] productive processes in a severe way” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71).
Sanchez (2010) suggests that “[t]he worst inequalities today make up a difference between
people not only in terms of ‘up’ and ‘down’ but also in terms of who are ‘in’ – protected –
and ones who are ‘out’ – those who are rejected” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71, also Wieviorka,
2007).
This up and down, and in an out determination by structures, suits the ‘us versus
them’ language of populism, thus justifying it in a sense as a natural strategic partner for
anti-establishment candidacies. Recall how Judis (2016) described populism as a type of
vertical logic in Chapter II. The frictions caused by structural changes helps explain the
real insecurities that were tapped into by the populists of 2016 (see Appendix J).
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What is interesting here is that while evolving structures determine who is in and
who is out (a non-technical, diminishing middle class would be out for instance), the
framing work of populism through its vertical logic, seeks to expand membership by
gaining those ousted by structures to gain momentum over establishment:
Identity in PSMs is much broader than the average movement, stretching to
cover nearly all available audiences. The in-group is not a small social
minority (e.g., sexual minorities, immigrants) or even a somewhat larger
swath of society (e.g., women, workers, the poor, pensioners, students, etc.);
rather, it is the people as a whole, save the vastly outnumbered elites
(Aslanidis, 2016, p. 306).
In 2016, to Sanders, a disadvantaged 99% was down and a corrupt, self-serving one
percent was up (see Appendix G). To Trump, a forgotten class of workers were down, the
nation’s border security and the means to defend it was down, and the elite leadership
charged with producing the perceived losing ethos was up (see Appendix E, Trade and
Related Job Loss, Appendix F, Appendix G, Figures 15 and 12 respectively). Their frames
sought to include those who identified as “the vulnerable,” those who were losing or who
had always struggled for access to the structural arenas that ran the world. This relates back
to Huntington’s (1968) theory on modernization, where establishment policies fail to keep
up with changing cultures and structures discussed in Chapter II.
Fear and Hope in Changing Structures and Lost Identities

We now know how structures that work for some at the exclusion of others in part
serves to create opportunity for populists to transform a vulnerable ‘people’ into to a voter
base. To mobilize this transition, however, requires a significant amount emotional framework. Aminzade and McAdam’s (2001) exploration on emotions used within collective
action frames point to the coupling work of distress and hope. An emotional framework
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seeks first to heighten a distressed emotion followed by a constructed hope for something
more: “It is only when anger gets joined with hope that the forms of action we normally
associate with social movements and revolutions are apt to take place” (p. 32). The
distressed emotion can range from anger, to fear including “threats to meaning and
membership” (p. 37). Loss of something once had – a status, security, maybe even certain
rights can also serve as the distressed emotion. To identify emotions is one thing. To
effectively execute their use as part of the motivational task in framing, is another. Though
seemingly innate, the aptitude to identify and tap into these emotions requires a leader with
the “ability to deploy emotional knowledge and define or manipulate emotion rules” (p.
35). Here we can see the potential for either a statesmen or demagogue (Federici, 1991) to
emerge, but still, a populist. Both the Trump and Sanders’ camps relied heavily on the
emotional aspect of framing – but as research would find it, so did Cruz and Clinton.
During the 2016 debate in Milwaukee, Clinton warned America that supporting
Sanders’ and his one-track issue of corruption, would do little to lift their barriers; her
attempt at countering the attack on establishment:
Yes, does Wall Street and big ﬁnancial interests, along with drug
companies, insurance companies, big oil, all of it, have too much inﬂuence?
You’re right. But if we were to stop that tomorrow, we would still have the
indifference, the negligence that we saw in Flint. We would still have racism
holding people back. We would still have sexism preventing women from
getting equal pay. We would still have LGBT people who get married on
Saturday and get ﬁred on Monday (D06, 1256-1261) (New York Times, 2016,
February 12, p. 32).
On the right-wing, Cruz used fear to try and garner more support when he said, “We
are one liberal justice away from a ﬁve‑justice radical leftist majority that would undermine
our religious liberty…” (R10, 805-808) (New York Times, 2016, February 26, p. 25).
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Trump’s reasoning device of “We don’t win anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post, 2015,
August 6, p. 7) was a line meant to trigger feelings of American, nationalist pride – but also
shame, followed by the hopeful anecdote of “Make America Great Again” used ad nauseum
in and out of debates. On the issue of terrorism, he used fear when he told Americans that
there was a problem of “tremendous hate” toward the U.S. (R12, 788) (New York times,
2016, March 11, p. 21). On the issue of healthcare, his emotional trigger attempt was
toward that of anger when he said that “insurance companies are getting rich on
Obamacare” (R08, 752-753) (New York Times, 2016, February 7, p. 22).
For Sanders, fear was reserved mostly for issues of foreign policy and climate
change. He accused both the Democrats and Republicans of poor foreign policy decisions
which destabilized the Middle East in their support for regime change when he said, “[b]ut
the point about foreign policy is not just to know that you can overthrow a terrible dictator,
it’s to understand what happens the day after” (D06, 886-887) (New York Times, 2016,
February 12, p. 23). It is important to note that a very similar frame of reference was also
used by Trump (R09, 254-255) (New York Times, 2016, February 14). With respect to
climate change, Sanders warned that “we have got to realize that this is a global
environmental crisis of unprecedented urgency… We have an enemy out there, and that
enemy is going to cause drought and ﬂoods and extreme weather disturbances. There’s
going to be international conﬂict” (D09, 791-792; 797-798) (New York Times, 2016, April
15, p. 23). On the issue of corruption, the emotional requirement Sanders was asking for
from supporters was one of anger against the systems in place – so much so that it was his
hope that they would be part of the march to ‘stand up and change it, something he said,
more than once, at nearly every debate: “And we can do that when millions of people stand
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up, ﬁght back, and create a government that works for all of us, not just the 1 percent”
(D09, 1706-1707) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 49). The frame analysis performed
for this study, therefore, supports the theory of heavy emotional framework. Reasoning and
framing devices were used throughout the debates as a means of triggering emotions and
mobilizing voters toward consensus and action.
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis

Backing on the discussion of the use of emotion in frame work, there exists a
potential for further nuance. During the debates, there is talk about the opioid crisis. One
of the host states, New Hampshire was dealing with this issue at an unprecedented level at
the time of the debates and so of course, it was brought up by both candidates and
moderators. There was also talk about pockets of unemployed, white neighborhoods, that
had fallen victim to changes in industry, energy trends and trade deals. This paper focuses
on the period of 2015-2016, where we see addiction and opioids being raised as a concern
at the national level for the first time in a while within the establishment/electoral arena.
At the time of this writing (early 2019) addiction grievances in New Hampshire has
increased – “An astonishing 53 percent of adults said in a Granite State poll last year that
drugs were the biggest problem facing the state — the first time in the poll’s history that a
majority named a single issue as the most important. (Jobs and the economy lagged a
distant second)” (Seelye, 2018, p. 3). The New York Times cited several possible factors of
the state’s decline into drug chaos, as discussed by researchers. Proximity to illegal drug
distribution points, cuts in drug treatment programs, the over-prescription of opioids by
doctors and then subsequent crackdowns that led more people searching for streetalternatives were all suspect. But researchers also pointed to “pockets of ‘economic
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degradation,’ especially in rural areas where jobs are few, and that may contribute to the
problem” (p. 3). To suggest that job loss is feeding the opioid crisis is conjecture at best;
more studies in this area are needed. But the loss of identity; loss of individual productivity
and feeling of worthiness, especially amidst the sweeping changes in structures of
employment, can point toward a future of further contention.
For a demographic where no jobs, lost identities, and a futureless feeling are
commonplace, is it any wonder then that when someone with a little bit of hope comes
along and practices a rhetoric that feels as though they are being directly spoken to,
responds? Subsequently, there has been a long-suffering portion of the American public
who has felt these same grievances since before the time of slavery. It is why Clinton, the
primary establishment candidate in 2016, purports to champion for those who are being
discriminated against, and those facing “barriers” – barriers she promised to break down.
Keep in mind that this is on the heels of other social movements and contentious American
politics that has been happening all the while in the background – Black Lives Matter,
#MeToo, etcetera. And so perhaps at the crux of all this contention, at the behest of
changing superstructures, we can look back to Huntington’s (1968) suggestion that
“sources of identity and association… may be undermined and destroyed... Others,
however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization
because they are capable” (Huntington, 1968, p. 38). As one part of the American
population seeks to solidify their voice, rightfully pushing for more – more inclusion, more
access and equality; all the while celebrating their collective identities, a newly vulnerable,
other part of the population is losing theirs.

©2019, Nancy Duffy

69

When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

2016 Pew Research Poll Comparison
Here I compare the grievances made salient during the framing process of the
debates as identified through the research of this paper to those identified by a Pew
Research poll taken during the 2016 primaries. The Pew Research Poll asked voters what
their top issues were for 2016. The economy was the top concern for voters (see Appendix
I), and the findings of this frame analysis agree. The economy heavily resonated with both
Republican and Democrat camps; a clear 80% of Clinton supporters conceded to it being
the most important issue, while 90% of Trump supporters agreed (Pew Research Center,
2016, p. 51).
Both the findings of this paper’s frame analysis and the 2016 Pew Research poll
tell an even larger story which resonates with the growing insecurity of our time. In 2016,
despite publicized reports of an increasing threat of climate change, for instance, climate
change during this time ranked lower on the list of voter issues. “Only about half of all
voters (52%) view the environment as very important” (Pew Research Center, 2016, p. 51).
In this study, it ranked lower as well. As noted earlier much of this ties in with ideological
underpinnings, as there was no discussion of climate change whatsoever during the
Republican debates. Of this phenomenon, one might wonder why the moderators –
Dickerson, Kelly, anyone – never asked about the issue in the first place? Nevertheless, the
Pew Research findings as well as those from this study points to a hierarchy of grievances
based on issue saliency during the primary season and highly susceptible to populist
framing, among other things.
Security studies reveal that populations find different ways to self-medicate during
difficult times. In times of insecurity “individuals seek one stable identity (regardless of its
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actual existence) to achieve biographical continuity in the context of the uncertain and
dislocating flux of globalization” (Botterill et al., 2016, p. 126). This coincides with
Aslanidis’ (2018) notion on how populist collective action frames are used to “construct a
resonant collective identity of ‘the People’ and to challenge elites” (p. 301).
Framing tactics aside, the saliency of an issue is also based on its resonance and
priority level for the voter. For example, without mitigating the importance of the
environment, Scruggs and Benegal (2012) in a study done shortly after the Great
Recession, found that public opinion on issues underwent significant changes while in
crises. During the Great Recession, for instance, there was a considerable decline in climate
change convictions “around 10-20% over a short period of a year or two,” suggesting “that
the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity
caused by the Great Recession” (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 505-6). This change in
conviction does not diminish the significance of any one issue in the Pew Research findings
(2016), rather, it points to a voter vulnerability toward issue saliency based on the
insecurities and grievances at hand.
The populists, whether warranted or not, and whether intentional or not, in 201516, were making an appeal to the insecurities of the US electorate. The 2008 recession, and
how it was made manifest, not only in the United States, but Canada and Europe made an
international audience painfully aware of the frailties of a global, neo-liberalist society.
Growing insecurities point to the presence of contention, a political opportunity for
intervention – and a constituency vulnerable to a populist master frame.
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2011 Social Movements of the Great Recession Comparison
The top four grievances personified during the 2016 American primary debates
were grievances that were also identified in Aslandis’ (2018) frame analysis (Appendix K).
In his study there was some variance between the movements of Spain, Greece and the
USA, but within America, corruption, rights and equality were commensurate with my
findings of economy, security, corruption and rights (see Appendices C and K). The
Aslanidis (2018) frame analysis involved the manifestos of the social movements of the
Great Recession. The line numbers within his findings were fewer because of his limited
scope (manifestos only). His categories, on the other hand, were more varied than those of
this study, as clusters of grievances in this study were further deduced into single
categories.
When it comes to perpetrators, however, our studies seem to have a consensus. Both
the social movements of the Great Recession and the populists of the 2016 primary debates
identified politicians, corporations, the economic system, and government (or what I refer
to as establishment) as the main perpetrators (See Appendices H and K).
A Prescribed Nostalgic Ideal
In the 1600s, nostalgia was a diagnosis; a medical illness relating to symptoms of
homesickness, typically suffered by those away at war (Goldman, 2016). To progressives,
the idea of basing decisions on a sentimentality of the past made little sense as the whole
notion of being ‘progressive’ was to make progress toward something newer and better
than before. To refer to nostalgia as a progressive, therefore, was akin to backward thinking
or “an obstacle to the reorganization of society along rational lines” (p. 211). But the use
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of nostalgia no longer falls according to party lines, and in 2016, its use within the electoral
arena had plenty of support.
Neil Irwin (2016) writes, “The economics of nostalgia may capture the hearts of a
certain portion of voters. But it is disconnected from the decades-long direction of the
United States economy and the interests of the businesses that are historically a crucial part
of the Republican coalition” (p. 1). Still, in maverick-style, populists ruled the debates in
trying to make it so: “Trump made mincemeat of his Republican opponents by repeating
Reagan’s promise to make America great again… [while] Sanders …[advocated] the
policies of the Truman Administration in an accent reminiscent of Woody Allen’s period
films…” (Goldman, 2016, p. 212).
What became apparent in this analysis was that all candidates, to varying degrees,
establishment and anti-establishment alike, regardless of ideological footings, used an
appeal toward nostalgia throughout the 2016 debates. By targeting the precarious, insecure
circumstances that electors found themselves in, the populist frame and the use of
emotional, opened up the construction of nostalgic appeals to connect directly to voters.
Like collective action frames, nostalgia also assists in identity work, acting as “a powerful
coping mechanism, helping to maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval”
(Murphy, 2009, p. 128). Users of nostalgia work to incorporate sentiments which “[signal]
general predispositions such as glorification of the past, drawing boundaries with other
national groups, political contention based on national identity, and transcendence or
coming to terms with class divisions” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 18).
For Trump, nostalgia meant expanding the master frame to include calls to a greater
sense of what America could be, based on what it once was. In using characteristics of the
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nationalist frame, many of his opening and closing remarks touted several framing devices
that implied a patriotic sentiment – “we’re don't anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post,
2015, August 6, p. 7). The implication is of course that ‘we’ used to!
Sanders used moral reasoning mixed in with nostalgia to motivate voter support.
He often refers to a disappearing middle class, one that was prosperous 40 years ago. While
in Flint, Michigan, Sanders tells the audience what their city once was: “Do you know that
in 1960-Detroit, Michigan was one of the wealthiest cities in America? Flint, Michigan,
was a prosperous city” (D07, 527-528) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 16). To go
with his often-used framing device about working longer hours for lower wages, Sanders
reverts to better days of the past when he said, “new jobs in manufacturing, in some cases
today, pay 50 percent less than they did 20 years ago” (D07, 534-536) (New York Times,
2016, March 7, p. 17). And on the issue of healthcare, Sanders offers up history as part of
his moral reasoning; another appeal to a nostalgic ideal: “Now, the truth is, that Frank
Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, do you know what they believed in? They believed that
health care should be available to all of our people” (D04, 426-428, 464-467) (New York
Times, 2016, January 18, p. 13).
Ted Cruz’s nostalgic framing consistently went back to the policies of Ronald
Reagan: “Every time we’ve pursued all three of those (tax, regulatory reform; sound money
— whether in the 1920s with Calvin Coolidge or the 1960s with JFK or the 1980s with
Ronald Reagan — the result has been incredible economic growth” (R04, 207-209) (Alter,
2015, p. 6).
Hillary Clinton’s nostalgic ideal shows up in the campaign as a nod to her
husband’s past accomplishments, a time when citizens enjoyed “lowered unemployment
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and increased manufacturing jobs” (D07, 544-546) (New York Times, 2016, March 7,
p.17). In response to charges about establishment politics and the deregulation of Wall
Street, Clinton boasts:
But if we are going to talk about the ’90s, let’s talk about 23 million new
jobs, incomes went up for everybody. The median African‑ American
income went up 33 percent at the end of the ’90s, and we lifted more people
out of poverty than at any other time in recent history. So we were on the
right path. More jobs, rising incomes (D07, 1063-1072) (New York Times,
2016, March 7, p. 33).
Clinton may word it differently, but she too wanted to make America great again,
“I don’t think we need to make America great again. America didn’t stop being great; we
have to make it whole again” (D07, 1424-1426) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 43).
What was once preserved as a diagnosis, nostalgia, at least in modern times, appears to
have turned into a non-partisan prognosis – that Americans can do better, because once
upon a time past, at least for some, they have. Like the work of collective action frames,
nostalgia also assists in identity work – as “a powerful coping mechanism hoping to
maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval” (Murphy, 2009, 128). Having
all candidates, establishment and otherwise, however, refer to the past for ‘better examples’
of what could be, might be more of a sign of the times.
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS
Niall Ferguson says that populism does not work (Fergusson, 2016). The unfolding
of American politics in 2016, however, teaches us that it can at least win. David Frum said
that “this new populism is a lie… a fake.” But the words that populists spoke in 2016
resonated from the same grievances that were just as true in 2011 as they are today. Much
like with the use of stereotypes, a populist pulls at the small thread of some truth
somewhere. Like a social movement, it is not something that happens in a vacuum.
By presenting themselves as anti-establishment candidates, Sanders and Trump
rode in on the remnants of the social movements of the Great Recession, which, despite
their size, had failed to deliver any real solutions; establishment remained stagnant. Unlike
the social movements of the Great Recession, the opportunity of the 2016 primaries opened
up the electoral arena and gave populists a chance to challenge establishment at its core.
Because the mere presence of populism or a growing number of social movements for that
matter, signal that something has clearly gone wrong, it is only prudent that everyone stop
and dig deeper. Establishment somewhere has failed. And if greater society fails to help
correct it, we in essence create the political opportunity for someone else to come along to
frame their version of what needs to be done.
Summary of Objectives and Approach
This paper set out to explore what happens when both establishment and social
movements fail and how the void to do something about overwhelming grievances creates
new opportunities for populism to rise up. Specifically, I sought to understand how antiestablishment candidates used populism to garner support from within the establishment
arena. By conducting a master frame analysis on the populist and establishment candidates
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during the 2016 American Presidential Primaries, I was able to unpack the framework of
all major candidates. This allowed the identification of the top grievances, perpetrators and
solutions as aired by the primary candidates during the debates, permitting a comparison
of framing positions between candidate types, but also between political parties.
In 2016, a hierarchy of grievances emerged, leaving clues to the many growing
insecurities of the American public. These hierarchies of grievances showed similar themes
to those of the social movements of the Great Recession (Aslanidis, 2018). Not only were
some of the grievances the same, but the perpetrators were nearly identical. Matters of
corruption, uncaring corporations, and growing inequality granted economic insecurity as
a top grievance. Terrorism (Paris bombings, San Bernardino), a rogue Russia and a nuclear
North Korea, combined with bad foreign policy brought matters of national/international
insecurity to the top of the list of grievances. A growing insecurity among group identities
brought rights and discrimination to the top of the list of grievances. The major theme, in
all findings, therefore, is one of insecurity in general.
Important Implications of Findings
The significant discovery that stood out in this research most lies in seeing the
power that exists in merely naming something. The debates and the frame analysis herein,
expose the rhetorical weaknesses of establishment candidacies in comparison to the
charismatic charges of anti-establishment opponents. In nearly every grievance, issue of
blame, or solution, the anti-establishment candidates led the charge (Appendices E, F, G,
H).
The use of emotion and nostalgia with the frequent use of reasoning and framing
devices played well to the legitimate growing insecurities of an electoral base. Rhetorical
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performances worked to further intrigue debate moderators which led to more questions
concerning the grievances and blames named by anti-establishment candidates. Again,
there is something to naming a grievance and repeating it like a slogan; blaming someone
or something and then putting minds at ease or at least instilling hope that things can change
in a very precise way. The solutions of populist candidates were specific, ranging from
something as concrete as building a wall to a free education paid for by a speculation tax
on Wall Street. The application of the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing
tasks was not only used but was repeated over and over again. Their content often set the
agenda on what was to be debated – in this sense; it was the maverick that was driving the
agenda from within the establishment electoral arena. As for establishment candidates, they
had a plan – a “five-point plan” (D03, 1379) (Washington Post, 2015, December 19, p. 38),
or a “three-point plan” (D04, 1066) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 32); (D08,
1372) (New York Times, 2016, March 10, p. 41); blame was abstract and solutions were
framed as the same. Establishment rhetoric had an un-coolness to it; theirs were
conversations of right and left, which were no match for the greater urgency of up and
down. And as the debates heated up, rather than meet the maverick challengers with
something better, their grievance became about the rhetoric itself.
The other discovery was in being able to see the grievances and perpetrators of the
2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuance of the same from the 2008 financial
crisis and the subsequent 2011 social movements. The pattern supports the notion that if
grievances are left unchecked, in combination with some other major change – more job
loss, a new drug crisis, a new financial crisis, stark changes in demographics and/or
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population for instance – that new political contentions and opportunities will present
themselves; and new challengers to the system will show up!
Being able to see the grievances and perpetrators identified throughout the debates
in comparison to those identified by Paris Aslanidis (2018) in the social movements of the
Great Recession – as well as the issues named by voters in 2016 was noteworthy. At the
close of the American Presidential Primaries (when Trump won the Republican leadership)
and again at the 2016 national election, the people of the United States chose populism
over the establishment. The framing worked. What is more, populism showed that winning
in the United States – that being anti-establishment and working toward authority within
the electoral arena is possible. The implication is bifurcated between the opening up of
further political opportunity to populist challengers, or at best, the raising of consciousness
to establishment powers that grievances must be addressed; that the electoral arena is
vulnerable.
The reemergence and success of populism during the 2016 primaries serves as an
important anecdote for future generations. “This story” Brooks (2016) writes, “is the
lodestar for cultural renewal and better politics, no matter one’s place on the ideological
spectrum” (p. 3). It is a story for establishment to ‘catch up’ with the modernizing structures
that quake beneath the feat of their electorate. The more that we can understand about the
meaning making and therefore motivational processes in politics, whether done
subconsciously or consciously on the part of its originator, the more we can find ways of
building a better consensus toward the resolution of world problems or even in the
critiquing of bad ideas.
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Research Limitations / Needed Future Work in the Field
While limiting the scope to the debates had its advantages, as discussed earlier in
the methodology section, other considerations could have further enriched the findings of
this study. Framing contests and important counter frames that took place apart from the
debates may have influenced the 2016 populist movement but were out of the scope for
this research design. This study, therefore, misses the opportunity of exploring framing
contests within political parties – the back and forth between Mitt Romney and Donald
Trump, for instance. The influence of media framing was also purposely not taken into
consideration. Additionally, populist frames exercised during the rallies and press
conferences of 2015/2016 that would have further enriched this study, were excluded.
Moderator influence was also problematic in this research in that they set the
agenda in terms of what questions were asked and to whom. In this sense, grievances were
addressed or brought up only if there was an opportunity to do so. In controlling these
opportunities, issues may have been brought up as grievances, not necessarily because they
were high on the framing agenda of candidacies, but because of moderator influence.
Additionally, questions and themes that occurred in the debates were highly suspectable to
current events such as the Paris bombing in November of 2015, and the passing of Justice
Scalia in February 2016.
Taking on the daunting task of conducting a master frame analysis has been an eyeopening experience. One of the most significant limitations in this research lies in the
inconsistencies of methodology and the issue of subjectivity within the field of framing
analysis itself. There is no shortage of criticism of its manner of practice nor the results of
its study. And yet an agreed-upon source with a precise methodology mapped out for those
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who dare in its execution continues to be elusive. Plenty of examples exist that utilize
specific topics – climate change, for instance, but not one that can translate into a simple
how-to method across various subject matter. I concur with Nisbet (2010) in that “the
process of frame analysis is extremely subjective with no one clear consensus on
methodology” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 45). Nevertheless, the methodology, as outlined by Van
Gorp (2010) proved useful for this study.
Will someone be able to reproduce this research according to the methodology set
out in this design and come up with the same findings? Not necessarily. But they should
come close –and the proximity of this research’s outcome to the 2016 Pew Research results
tell me that I am on the right track. The subjectivity, therefore, built into the process of
frame analysis makes it fickle at its worst, but its utility in excavating patterns and
effectiveness, makes it hopeful at its best.
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FTAxfLpZMgBY0hc&index=3

Judy Woodruff,
Gwen Ifill

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/politic
s/transcript-of-the-democratic-presidentialdebate.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/us/politic
s/transcript-of-the-democratic-presidentialdebate.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/11/14/the-cbs-democratic-debatetranscript-with-insight-from-thefix/?utm_term=.5089edb7d710

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL
eAhy4TE2-hXvpkc6s3HCFCjm4qFpnZFh

CBS News/KCCI/
The Des Moines Register

Wynn Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV

Drake University, Des Moines, IA

Original Transcript Link
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/10/13/the-oct-13-democratic-debatewho-said-what-and-what-itmeans/?utm_term=.a98b9963e858

John Dickerson
Nancy Cordes
Kevin Cooney
Des Moines Register's
Kathie Obradovich

Video Link to Full Debate
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0M8
P24AGcY&list=PLhohPPRysee2GVVmo
GFTAxfLpZMgBY0hc

Moderators

CNN/Facebook

Media Host
Anderson Cooper
Juan Carlos Lopez
Dana Bash
Don Lemon

Location of Broadcast

2016 DNC Debates - Full 2016 Primaries Debate Schedule
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Appendix A. 2016 Democratic National Convention Debate Schedule

https://youtu.be/ou0Qmcdfn04

https://youtu.be/wpCOloV3DZk

https://youtu.be/gLUxXiaP6LQ

Jake Tapper,
Hugh Hewitt,
Dana Bash
Carl Quintanilla
John Harwood
Becky Quick
Neil Cavuto,
Maria Bartiromo,
Gerard Baker

CNN/ Salem Radio

CNBC/ Westwood
One

Fox Business/ WSJ

Coors Events Ctr.,
Boulder, CO

Milwaukee Theatre,
Milwaukee, WI

16-Sep-2015

28-Oct-2015

10-Nov-2015

2

3

4
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Original Transcript Link
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https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/re
publican-presidential-debate-36768760

Martha Raddatz
David Muir
Josh McElveen
Mary Katherine Ham

Fox News/ Google

ABC News/
IJReview.com

CBS News

St. Anselm College,
Goffstown, NH

Peace Center, Greenville,
SC

28-Jan-2016

6-Feb-2016

13-Feb-2016

7

8

9

https://youtu.be/Un3OhYs-tCE

Excluded from study (Trump absent from
debate)

Bret Baier
Chris Wallace
Megyn Kelly

Iowa Events Center, Des
Moines, IA

14-Jan-2016

6

John Dickerson

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/wp/2016/01/14/6th-republican-debatetranscript-annotated-who-said-what-andwhat-it-meant/?utm_term=.4f29dd75dcaa
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTo2
X4eG8cY&list=PLmnVWR5T9_di8nFS
mHp_W-dIUl3_TZXC1

Neil Cavuto
Maria Bartiromo

Fox Business/
Facebook

N. Charleston Coliseum,
N. Charleston, SC

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
politics/transcript-of-the-republicanpresidential-debate.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/us/
politics/transcript-of-the-republicanpresidential-debate-in-new-hampshire.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/wp/2016/01/28/7th-republican-debatetranscript-annotated-who-said-what-andwhat-it-meant/?utm_term=.d08445930fe8

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/wp/2015/12/15/who-said-what-andwhat-it-meant-the-fifth-gop-debateannotated/?utm_term=.a23e3d632363

https://youtu.be/YHYk0K7iszo

Wolf Blitzer

CNN/ Salem Radio

The Venetian, Las
Vegas, NV

15-Dec-2015

http://time.com/4107636/transcript-readthe-full-text-of-the-fourth-republicandebate-in-milwaukee/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/wp/2015/10/28/the-third-republicandebate-annotating-thetranscript/?utm_term=.afb12acf8100

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/th
e-fix/wp/2015/09/16/annotated-transcriptseptember-16-gopdebate/?utm_term=.67756c6d56ac

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/p
ost-politics/wp/2015/08/06/annotatedtranscript-the-aug-6-gopdebate/?utm_term=.182bac74bcbe

5

https://youtu.be/2rU4W3yfd58

Air Force One Pavilion
of the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library,
Simi Valley, CA

Megyn Kelly
Brett Baier
Chris Wallace

Fox News/ Facebook

Quicken Loans Arena,
Cleveland, OH

6-Aug-2015

Video Link to Full Debate

1

Moderators

Media Host

Location of Broadcast

Date

NO.

2016 RNC Debates - Full 2016 Primaries Debate Schedule
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Appendix B. 2016 Republican National Convention Debate Schedule
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Fox News

CNN/Salem Radio/
Washington Times

Fox Theatre, Detroit, MI

University of Miami,
BankUnited Center,
Coral Gables, FL

3-Mar-2016

10-Mar-2016

12

CNN/Salem,
Radio/Telemundo

University of Houston,
Houston, TX

25-Feb-2016

10

11

Media Host

Location of Broadcast

Date

NO.

96
Jake Tapper

Megyn Kelly
Bret Baier
Chris Wallace

Wolf Blitzer
Maria Celesta Arrasas
Dana Bash
Hugh Hewitt

Moderators

1) https://youtu.be/GzPIbX1pzDg
2) https://youtu.be/6eGK4dg1IVY
3) https://youtu.be/Uaujjp3JKGY
4) https://youtu.be/aFkPHp9BR2o
5) https://youtu.be/0oSFZr3udNM
6) https://youtu.be/VeS9oKNzgMQ
7) https://youtu.be/SGKaluT4d5A

https://youtu.be/h2nj-zCV-XM

Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part

https://youtu.be/GasRDffe1Xg

Video Link to Full Debate

2016 RNC Debates - Full 2016 Primaries Debate Schedule

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/
politics/transcript-of-the-republicanpresidential-debate-in-florida.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/
politics/transcript-of-the-republicanpresidential-debate-in-detroit.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/
politics/transcript-of-the-republicanpresidential-debate-in-houston.html

Original Transcript Link
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Appendix C. Top Grievances for 2016 Anti-Establishment Candidates
Top Grievances for Anti-Establishment Candidates
30.0%
25.0%

20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%

Figure 3. Top Grievances: Anti-Establishment, 2016 American Primaries

Figure 4. Top Grievances: Bernie Sanders, 2016
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Figure 6. Top Grievances: Ted Cruz, 2016
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Figure 5. Top Grievances: Donald Trump, 2016
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Appendix D. Top Grievances: 2016 Establishment Candidates
Top Grievances for Establishment Candidates
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Figure 7. Top Grievances: Establishment, 2016 American Primaries
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Figure 8. Top Grievances: Hillary Clinton, 2016
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Figure 9. Top Grievances: Jeb Bush, 2016
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Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown
All Economy
(Includes Grievances of
Unemployment, Trade, Jobs,
Low, Stagnant Wages)

Reference to the 2008
Financial Crisis

48.7%

41.0%

41.1%

16.7%
Sanders Clinton

21.5%
6.3%
Bush

Sanders Clinton

14.4%
Trump

2.6%

2.6%

5.1%

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Grievance: 2008 Financial Crisis

Cruz

Figure 10. Economic Grievances, Combined

Economy / Economic System

Unemployment / UnderEmployment
53.1%

32.4%
21.6%

18.6%
10.8%
Sanders Clinton

Bush

Trump

16.7%

6.3%

Cruz

Sanders Clinton

9.4%

3.1%

Bush

Trump

28.1%
Cruz

Grievance: Economy, Economic System

Grievance: Unemployment / UnderEmployment

Trade and Related Jobs / Job
Loss

Lower, Stagnant Wages
82.6%

45.2%
31.5%
6.8%
Sanders Clinton

2.7%
Bush

13.0% 0.0%

13.7%
Trump

Sanders Clinton

Cruz

0.0%

Trump

Cruz

Grievance: Lower, Stagnant Wages

Grievance: Trade and Related Job Loss
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Appendix F. National / International Security Grievances: Breakdown
All Security
(Includes Depleted Military, National/International
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism)
32.02%
21.49%

18.86%

Sanders

14.04%

13.60%

Clinton

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 11. Security Grievances, Combined

National / International
Security / Military

Foreign Policy
28.40
%

31

4

Sanders Clinton

Bush

18.52
%

18

14

3

Trump

Cruz

Sanders Clinton

Terrorism

24.05% 22.78%
17.72%

12.66%

Sanders Clinton

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Grievance: Terrorism
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Appendix G. Remaining Grievances
Corruption and Establishment Politics
44.7%

28.0%
18.2%
3.8%
Sanders

5.3%

Clinton

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 12. Corruption and Establishment Politics

Rights and Discrimination: Breakdown

Rights & Discrimination

36.9%

34.6%

Sanders

Clinton

6.2%

13.1%

9.2%

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 13. Grievance: Rights and Discrimination, Combined

Rights

Discrimination and Equality
(exclusing Economic Inequality)

32.8%
20.9%

19.4%

42.2%

48.4%

16.4%

10.4%
Sanders Clinton

Bush

1.6%
Trump

Sanders Clinton

Cruz

Grievance: Rights
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Remaining Grievances (Continued)

Healthcare

Immigration

36.7%

35.2%
24.5%

18.4%

6.1%
Sanders Clinton

Bush

23.1%
14.3%

Trump

Cruz

19.8%

12.1%

9.9%

Sanders Clinton

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 14. Grievance: Healthcare

Figure 15. Grievance: Immigration

Division and Rhetorical
Choice

Infrastructure
56.8%

41.7%
27.1%

27.3%
4.2%

12.5% 14.6%
Sanders Clinton

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Sanders Clinton

4.5%

11.4%

0.0%

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 16. Grievance: Division and
Rhetorical Choice

Figure 17. Grievance: Infrastructure

Education System

Gun Legislation

52.5%

34.3%

40.0%

30.0%

Sanders Clinton

5.0%

5.0%

Bush

Trump

7.5%
Cruz

Sanders Clinton

Figure 18. Grievance: Education
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8.6%

8.6%

8.6%

Bush

Trump
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Figure 19. Grievance: Gun Legislation
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Remaining Grievances (Continued)

Climate Change

Social Security

38.7%

58.1%
41.9%

Sanders Clinton

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Bush

Trump

Cruz

19.4% 19.4%
Sanders Clinton

6.5%

16.1%
Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 20. Grievance: Climate Change

Figure 21. Grievance: Social Security

Addiction / Opioid Crisis

Supreme Court Choice /
Decisions

34.8%
40.7%

21.7% 21.7%

Sanders Clinton

Bush

22.2%

13.0%

8.7%
Trump

Cruz

Sanders Clinton

Figure 22. Grievance: Addiction / Opioid
Crisis

42.9%

Sanders Clinton

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 24. Democratic Participation
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Bush

Trump

Cruz

Figure 23. Grievance: Supreme Court

Democratic Participation;
Low Voter Turnout

57.1%

14.8% 11.1% 11.1%
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Appendix H. Perpetrators
Perpetrators
Identified During the 2016 American Primary Debates
Big Business / Corporations / The 1% / Business Persons
Poor Foreign Policy
Corruption
Government / Establishment
"Rigged" Economic System
Immigration
Banking
Healthcare System - Drug Companies
Media
Rhetoric (Politically Correct v. Divisive)
Discrimination
Education
Illegal Drug Trade; Overprescribing

23.3%
16.1%
14.2%
13.4%
7.0%
6.0%
4.8%
4.7%
2.9%
2.8%
2.5%
1.6%
0.7%

Figure 25. Perpetrators
(Note for sake of space, the names along the x-axis for the remaining charts of
Appendix H are uniform and in this order: Sanders, Clinton, Bush, Trump, Cruz).
Businesses and Corporations Breakdown
Figure 26. Big Business and Corporations, Breakdown

Others to Blame

Figure 27. Poor Foreign
Policy

Figure 28. Corruption

Figure 29. Corrupt Criminal
Justice System

Corruption
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Perpetrators (Continued)

Figure 30. Government /
Establishment

Figure 33. Banks / Bankers

Figure 36. Rhetoric
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Figure 31. Rigged / Poor
Economy

Figure 32. Immigration

Figure 34. Healthcare
Industry & Drug Companies

Figure 35. Media

Figure 37. Discrimination & Racism
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Appendix I. Grievances and Pew Research Poll Comparison
Pew Research Poll on Top
Issues for Voters in 2016

Top Grievances Named by Key
Candidates During the Debates
2016 American Presidential
Primaries

Economy
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Source of Pew Research Data:
Pew Research Center. (2016, July 07). Economy and terrorism are top issues for voters in
2016. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in2016-election/4_1-2/
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Appendix J.
A Congruence between Up and Down Politics, Populism, and Structural Insecurity
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Appendix K. Framing of the Great Recession Movements
(A reference to the 2018 Paris Aslanidis Study)
The following two tables are reprinted from: Populism as a Collective Action Master
Frame for Transnational Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464, with the
expressed written permission of its author, Paris Aslanidis.

Source:
Aslanidis, P. (2018). Populism as a Collective Action Master Frame for Transnational
Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464.
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